Know Everything That Can Be Known About Everybody : The Birth of the Credit Report by Weinberg, Jonathan
Volume 63 Issue 3 Article 3 
10-1-2018 
"Know Everything That Can Be Known About Everybody": The Birth 
of the Credit Report 
Jonathan Weinberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan Weinberg, "Know Everything That Can Be Known About Everybody": The Birth of the Credit 
Report, 63 Vill. L. Rev. 431 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2018]
“KNOW EVERYTHING THAT CAN BE KNOWN ABOUT EVERYBODY”:
THE BIRTH OF THE CREDIT REPORT
JONATHAN WEINBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
NOT too long ago, the Equifax credit bureau revealed that hackershad copied from its records the personal information of up to 143
million people—driver’s license and social security numbers, criminal
records and medical debt, payment records and rental histories.1  Con-
sumers struggling to cope with that exposure confronted a reality of the
digital age: The large credit bureaus—Equifax, Experian, and Trans-
Union—have commodified information about the rest of us, making their
money by collecting our data, processing it and selling it to others.  They
know most of what there is to know about us—those three firms collect 4.5
billion pieces of consumer information every month.2  They plug that in-
formation into shadowy computer algorithms, which generate judgments
about our credit-worthiness and financial stability.  Those largely-unap-
pealable judgments determine whether we can get credit, and on what
terms.  And there’s not a lot any of us can do about it—we are not, after
all, the credit bureaus’ customers.  Rather, we’re the product they’re sell-
ing.3 We are, as one reporter put it, “trapped in Equifax’s vast web of data,
with no recourse and no ability to opt out.”4
One might be forgiven for thinking that our situation, finding our-
selves at the mercy of firms whose business is to sell our information, is a
new thing—at the very least a product of the Information Age, post-dating
the introduction of credit cards and mainframe computers.  In fact, it’s
much older than that.  The story that has unfolded in our relationship
with Equifax echoes the story surrounding the emergence in the mid- to
late- nineteenth century of the first credit bureau, the Equifax of its day:
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty
Development, Wayne State University.  I’m grateful for comments and suggestions
by Jessica Litman, Rebecca Eisenberg, Steven Winter, Gautam Hans, and
participants in the University of Michigan Intellectual Property Workshop.  In
addition, I benefitted from the impeccable research assistance of Ewelina Sawicka.
1. See Stacey Cowley & Tara Siegel Bernard, As Equifax Amassed Ever More Data,
Safety Was a Sales Pitch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jSPZb2
[https://perma.cc/PC93-CGBU].
2. See id.
3. For an early expression of this oft-repeated thought, see Claire Wolfe, Little
Brother is Watching You: The Menace of Corporate America (1999), www.loompanics
.com/Articles/LittleBrother.html
4. Ron Lieber, Why the Equifax Breach Stings So Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2jRsnUr [https://perma.cc/82YN-ERXE]; see also Cowley
& Bernard, supra note 1.
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initially known as the Mercantile Agency, it was the corporate predecessor
of today’s Dun & Bradstreet.  In a world in which such things were un-
known, the Mercantile Agency sought to establish and maintain a file on
every American who might ever seek commercial credit.
The story of the Mercantile Agency—deeply controversial and deeply
influential—has lessons for us in understanding Equifax and other data
brokers today.  It, and its rivals, had a momentous effect on American life.
Over the course of a few decades, credit bureaus put in place a new, perva-
sive, network of social monitoring.  That monitoring generated an infor-
mation product that the credit bureaus sold in the marketplace, and that
became a part of the nation’s economic infrastructure “next in the rank of
importance to railroads and telegraphs.”5
In order to make that happen, the credit bureaus had to figure out
how to build a modern database system without the help of computers.
They struggled to reduce thick narratives and messy life prospects to sim-
ple ratings codes.  Today, we’ve largely solved the challenge of building
large database systems; the challenge of flattening and reducing rounded
human lives so that they fit neatly into those databases, though, is one
we’re still grappling with.
The credit bureaus raised far-reaching privacy issues, strikingly similar
to the ones we face today.  Modern privacy law did not yet exist; folks in
the nineteenth century did not have the tools or the vocabulary to couch
their privacy concerns as legal claims.  But they could and did bring defa-
mation lawsuits.  Their distress over the commodification of personal in-
formation, and their privacy-related fears about the improper
dissemination of that information, played out within the defamation case
law.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CREDIT BUREAU
Heading into the mid-nineteenth century, Americans were swelling
westward across the continent.  The only large cities were on the Atlantic
coast.6  Once or twice a year, retailers from all over the country converged
on New York and other Eastern cities to buy merchandise that they could
resell at home.  Typically, they bought those goods on credit, and paid for
them only months later, after the goods were sold.7  This was the system of
5. Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214, 219 (C.C.D. Md. 1882).
6. As late as 1830, of the nation’s forty largest urban areas, only three (New
Orleans, Cincinnati, and Louisville) were outside the territory of the original thir-
teen colonies. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Population of the 90 Urban Places:
1830, https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/
tab06.txt [https://perma.cc/S427-JERX].
7. See ROY A. FOULKE, THE SINEWS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 110-14 (1941).
Competitive pressures, in turn, required the retailers to extend credit to their cus-
tomers.  As a baker put it in an 1841 letter, “I cannot sell for cash and if I do not
trust I cannot sell.” SCOTT SANDAGE, BORN LOSERS: A HISTORY OF FAILURE IN
AMERICA 106 (2005).
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“mercantile credit.”  As one 1838 commentator put it, “[t]here are few
circumstances connected with the American Union more worthy of re-
mark than the credit system,” enabling “traders of Missouri and Arkan-
sas—of Mississippi and Alabama—of Illinois and Michigan—distant 1,000,
1,500, or 2,000 miles and returning but once in 12 or 18 months,” to sup-
ply themselves with goods that they would pay for some months later.8
Mercantile credit functioned as venture and startup capital for many
stores, workshops, and farms; without it, small western retailers—who
themselves sold to their customers on credit—could not have existed.
From the 1820s to the 1850s, the typical western retailer operated on one
to two years’ credit from businesses back East.9  In 1858, the Mercantile
Agency estimated that more than 150,000 village and country stores owed
an average of $14,500 each to urban jobbers; that aggregate debt
amounted to more than half of the nation’s GDP.10
How was an eastern merchant to know, though, whether a faraway
buyer was reliable?  A contemporary store owner offering book credit to a
local customer, all within a single community, could make a credit assess-
ment based on his personal knowledge of the borrower, his habits, and his
family resources.  Benjamin Franklin had spoken to that sort of local
knowledge years earlier in explaining that a creditor will gladly extend
your loans upon hearing the “sound of your hammer at five in the morn-
ing, or eight at night,” but “if he sees you at the billiard-table, or hears
your voice in a tavern, when you should be at work, he sends for his money
the next day.”11  No such informal knowledge was available, though, when
lender and borrower were a thousand miles apart.  For a time, creditors
sought to rely on letters of recommendation supplied by the borrower, but
those were unreliable and easily abused.12
The contemporary understanding was that most borrowers at some
point would be unable to pay their debts, and that bankruptcy under then-
extant laws would yield little for business creditors.  This made it all the
more important that merchants have some means of gauging the pros-
pects of their customers.13  Yet how was this to be done?  Some large firms
began the practice of dispatching investigators or traveling reporters to
learn about their faraway customers, but this was a slow and expensive
8. See FOULKE, supra note 7, at 114.
9. See ROWENA OLEGARIO, THE ENGINE OF ENTERPRISE: CREDIT IN AMERICA 62
(2016).
10. See id.
11. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 49
(Talcott Parsons trans. Scribner 1958) (1904) (quoting Benjamin Franklin), quoted
in Josh Lauer, From Rumor to Written Record: Credit Reporting and the Invention of Fi-
nancial Identity in Nineteenth-Century America, 49 TECH. & CULTURE 301, 307 (2008).
12. See ROWENA OLEGARIO, A CULTURE OF CREDIT: EMBEDDING TRUST AND
TRANSPARENCY IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 38-39 (2006); JOSH LAUER, CREDITWORTHY: A
HISTORY OF CONSUMER SURVEILLANCE AND FINANCIAL IDENTITY IN AMERICA 30-31
(2017); FOULKE, supra note 7, at 289.
13. See OLEGARIO, supra note 9, at 36-37, 72-75.
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process.14  It was sometimes possible for eastern wholesalers to gain infor-
mation from local postmasters, storekeepers or lawyers, and a few informal
blacklists and “spy-books” began to spring up, but they were unsystematic
and limited in scope.15
It was a businessman and abolitionist named Louis Tappan who set in
place a new approach to the problem.16  When Henry Thoreau visited
New York City in the summer of 1841, he happened upon Tappan’s newly-
founded Mercantile Agency, and noted his impressions in a letter: Tappan
had “invented . . . a new and very important business.”  It was “a kind of
intelligence office for the whole country, with branches in the principal
cities, giving information with regard to the credit and affairs of every man
of business in the country.”17
A. The Production of Credit Information
The Mercantile Agency idea was simple and revolutionary: the firm
would pull together the local knowledge of every community in the U.S.,
regarding every business owner in that community, and store it all in a
gigantic, centralized, constantly updated file system, available to anyone
who paid subscription fees.  The first step in the process was the recruiting
of unpaid local agents to file reports on business owners in their commu-
nities.  Most often, they were local lawyers, providing Tappan with infor-
mation in return for the promise that the lawyer/correspondents could
represent eastern creditors bringing debt collection actions against their
subjects.18  One of those correspondents was a young Illinois lawyer
14. Sheldon Church pioneered credit reporting in the U.S. as a self-employed
travelling reporter as early as 1827. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
15. See LAUER, supra note 12, at 31; SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 107-10.
16. Tappan wasn’t the first entrepreneur to come up with the idea of a
broadly-focused, third-party, subscription-based credit reporter.  Solo travelling re-
porters had existed much earlier, see supra note 14, and the firm of Griffin, Cleave-
land, and Campbell had attempted a business much like Tappan’s in the 1830s.
Griffin, Cleaveland, and Campbell quickly failed, though, and Tappan bought its
subscriber list. See JAMES D. NORRIS, R.G. DUN & CO. 1841-1900: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CREDIT-REPORTING IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10-14 (1978); OLEGARIO, supra
note 12, at 40.  Competitors quickly sprang up after Tappan opened his doors, but
only one—founded by John M. Bradstreet—became as successful.  That company’s
initial name of incorporation appears in various sources as the Improved Mercan-
tile Agency, see JOSEPH W. ERRANT, THE LAW RELATING TO MERCANTILE AGENCIES 4
(1889); MOSES KING, KING’S HANDBOOK OF BOSTON 290 (4th ed. 1881); the Im-
proved Mercantile and Law Agency for Cities, see OLEGARIO, supra note 9, at 65;
and Bradstreet’s Improved Commercial Agency, see FOULKE, supra note 7, at 297.  It
was soon renamed Bradstreet & Son, and later the Bradstreet Company.  It ulti-
mately merged with the Mercantile Agency (which by then had been purchased by
R.G. Dun) to form the modern-day Dun & Bradstreet. See SANDAGE, supra note 7,
at 121-22.
17. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 99-100.  For further discussion of the “intelli-
gence office,” see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
18. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 308; OLEGARIO, supra note 1212, at 49-50, 52,
55.
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss3/3
2018] BIRTH OF THE CREDIT REPORT 435
named Abraham Lincoln.19  Other correspondents included sheriffs,
merchants, postmasters, and bank employees.20  By 1844 Tappan’s firm
had over 300 correspondents; by 1846 nearly 700; by the early 1870s, more
than 10,000.21
The firm encountered some resistance.  At the very outset, one New
York newspaper challenged the propriety of “the business of a secret in-
quiry into the private affairs and personal standing of everybody buying
goods in New York.”22  Tappan, defending himself via an advertisement in
his second year of operations, answered that he was not operating a “sys-
tem of espionage,” but merely extending and systematizing the sorts of
inquiries merchants routinely made about persons applying for credit.23
And, in important ways, that was right: the task of the local agent was
to translate each individual’s local reputation, as reflected in community
views and derived from the sorts of sources community members had al-
ways relied on, into a written document and to send that document to
Tappan in New York.24  An admiring article in the 1851 business press
described the Mercantile Agency’s reports as designed to state the sub-
ject’s overall reputation in his local community—“whether he owns prop-
erty, and is a man of good character—whether he does a legitimate or a
speculative business—and whether he is competent, steady, and attentive,
or otherwise.”25  To do that, the reporters relied on their personal views,
communal gossip, and such information—property, habits, family connec-
tions—as was available to them and seemed relevant.26
Some contemporary accounts of Mercantile Agency reports empha-
sized their accumulation of factual detail.  Two 1856 press reports, thus,
imagined the following as a typical report:
Peter Mullen, ,  Co., Illinois.  Has done business in the
same store for the last thirty-five years—made some money—
owns a lot in Chicago heavily mortgaged—is the oldest of two
19. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 156-58.
20. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 49-50.
21. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 308; see also OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 54,
161.  Over time, the firm came to rely increasingly heavily on paid travelling re-
porters as a supplement to its unpaid correspondents; by the 1890s, “much of the
routine reporting and revisions” was done by those employees. See NORRIS, supra
note 16, at 128-30.
22. New York Morning Courier (June 22, 1841) (archive maintained at fultonhis-
tory.com); SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 110; OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 58.
23. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 57-58; Lauer, supra note 11, at 309.
24. See OLEGARIO, supra note 13, at 51; SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 164.
25. The Mercantile Agency, 24 HUNT’S MERCHANT’S MAG. & COM. REV. 46, 48
(Jan. 24, 1851).  The author went on to say that Tappan’s approach “insures accu-
racy; for [the Agency’s proprietors] deal in facts, and not in opinions.” Id. at 49
(emphasis in original).  That judgment, however, was not the whole story.  For
further discussion, see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
26. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 309-10.
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children—has lately married his second wife—is professionally a
Methodist, and enjoys a general reputation for honesty.27
The reports, though, commonly included more than a dollop of gos-
sip and subjectivity.  An 1860 report on one T.R. Maddox of Jackson
County, Alabama, thus, included this notation: “The general opinion here
is, that he is in a v[ery] critical [and] embarr[assed] condition, and that
there is a strong probability of his failure.”28  Another, 1844, entry ended
with this judgment: “Honest & likely man but not attentive to his
bus[iness]—is a ‘Singer’ which takes up too much of his time . . . sh[oul]d
be watched a little.”29  A Jackson, Michigan grocer was described as keep-
ing “a very good stock” but “a stranger, not extensively known.”30  The
ledger entry for one Alexander Bateman, a grocer, related that he seemed
“close & steady to bus[iness], but don’t think he will succeed, he is unpop-
ular.  He is rather of an unhappy disposition.”31
As ledger entries updated, they would tell the story of a life: Robert L.
Brown, a high-minded Virginia planter, in 1855, was “Rich in prop[erty]:
much in debt, a g[oo]d fellow, poor manager, fast liver, slow pay.”  None-
theless, he was “v[ery] good for debts.”32  Not too long after that entry was
written, Brown declared bankruptcy, owing $50,000. Nonetheless, the Mer-
cantile Agency ledger continued to follow him: he had “moved to Lynch-
burg, where his wife on the bounty of some of her friends is teaching at a
female school.”  Subsequent reports provided an updated picture: “I un-
derstand that he has no energy & never will make a dollar, I reckon.”33
As a business proposition, the point of Tappan’s file system was to give
subscribers information relating to two predictive questions: would the in-
dividual succeed in business, and thus be able to pay his debts? and did he
have the resources suggesting ability to pay his debts if the business
failed?34  To that end, his system came to emphasize what became known
as the three “C”s of credit reporting: character, capacity, and capital.
“Character” referenced an individual’s personality: Was he hard-working?
Responsible?  Reliable?  Well-liked?  Did he drink to excess?  Gamble?  En-
27. Id. at 310.
28. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 111 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 153
(“Can’t say that he has failed [and] presume it is not so . . . but we repeat such was
the current rumor as utter[e]d by a thousand tongues.”).
29. Id. at 119.
30. OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 51.
31. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 111; see also id. at 102-03.
32. Id. at 146.
33. Id.
34. I’m using the male gender pronoun in this paper to refer to the Mercan-
tile Agency’s data subjects, in recognition of the fact that the great majority of
nineteenth-century U.S. business owners were men.  I don’t want to obscure the
fact, though, that there were women business owners throughout this period:
About 145,000 women were engaged in business pursuits in 1870, making up
about one in ten of all urban businesspeople.  Nearly all of those businesses were
small and thinly capitalized. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 108-12.
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gage in sexual immorality?35  Americans in the second half of the nine-
teenth century saw character as indispensable to credit and business
success.36  The Mercantile Agency thus boasted that its credit reporting
“made men take their real character along with them”37: They could no longer
be libertines and wastrels at home, yet hold themselves out as solid and
thrifty when out of town on business.  Rather, by virtue of credit reporting,
“the character they bear at home” could be seen “wherever they go to do
business.”38
Beyond those considerations was “capacity,” or business ability, evi-
denced by an individual’s past business and employment history.  “Capi-
tal,” finally, covered the property the person had access to, either through
his own ownership or through family or business connections.39  The firm
dispatched extensive circulars to its correspondents detailing the sort of
information to be included in reports if available.40
As the story of Robert L. Brown, above, illustrates, the information in
credit reports wasn’t always reliable.  Understanding that hard data wasn’t
always available, the Mercantile Agency urged its correspondents to pro-
vide their “impressions . . .  judging from appearances.”41  The resulting
reports, inevitably, were untrustworthy; the information they passed along
was sometimes flatly wrong.42  At best, they constituted “a variable and un-
systematic collection of facts, judgments and rumors.”43 Nonetheless,
merchants offering credit believed the reports to be useful, and so Tap-
pan’s firm prospered.44
Once reports reached the Mercantile Agency, clerks entered them
into its files.  Individual entries began with the business proprietor’s name
(and sometimes his address), and his line of business.  There followed a
single paragraph containing reports received about that person, unedited
35. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 309-10.
36. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 80-107.
37. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 115 (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 309-10; OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 82.
40. See, e.g., OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 64.
41. Bruce G. Carruthers & Barry Cohen, Calculability and Trust: Credit Rating in
Nineteenth-Century America 17 (Sept. 2012) (quoting Letter from Office of the Mer-
cantile Agency to correspondents (Jul. 25, 1872)).
42. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 117.
43. Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 41, at 24.  The modern approach to
credit rating foregrounds a debtor’s past payment history as a key predictor of its
future credit-worthiness.  Nineteenth-century merchants, though, were unwilling
to share that information with Tappan or with each other. See Kenneth Lipartito,
The Narrative and the Algorithm: Genres of Credit Reporting from the Nineteenth Century to
Today 15-16 (Jan. 2, 2010); OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 80-81.
44. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 41, at 51-53.  A satisfied 1851 cus-
tomer, thus explained that “for every dollar I pay for information, I save one hun-
dred,” SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 162; credit agencies were thus part of the “system
of necessary luminaries for the prosecution of a successful business.” New York
Daily Times (Nov. 7, 1851), at 1, col. 3).
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except for their arrangement in abbreviated language to save space. Up-
dates to a given entry were signified by an intervening small blank space,
the date, and a code identifying the correspondent.45
Those entries, in turn, were handwritten into ledgers, organized by
geographical location, at the Mercantile Agency’s New York office.  By
1851, according to a journalist’s report, that office held more than 100
large ledger books, each with six to seven hundred pages of entries, and
each page holding up to 1500 words (in tiny handwriting).  More than
thirty employees were constantly engaging with the database, “condensing,
copying, and giving out reports, carrying on the correspondence, [et]c.”46
Organizational problems, though, presented themselves immediately:
Handwritten in bound books, the reports could not be reorganized on the
fly.  They had to be updated as new information came in, and they had to
accommodate the fact that the same individuals would appear in different
locations, with different partners, or in differently-named businesses.  Ac-
cordingly, the filing system evolved as the system scaled; entries weren’t
arranged alphabetically or in any other universally-applied manner.47
New reports might be inserted wherever they would fit.48  Multiple index-
ing systems were sometimes found side by side, and entries spanning de-
cades could be found in the same volume.  The firm devised a
complicated scheme of indexing and cross-referencing, sometimes de-
noted by pointing fingers drawn in the margins, to connect references
that might be scattered across multiple volumes.49
The system was further complicated by the Mercantile Agency’s estab-
lishment of its first branch office (in Boston) in 1843, followed shortly by
offices in Philadelphia and Baltimore.  These offices were partly or wholly
owned by other parties, but contributed a share of their profits to the cen-
tral firm.  A Cincinnati office followed in 1849; ones in Louisville and St.
Louis in 1850; and one in New Orleans in 1851.50  By the start of the Civil
War, the agency would have offices in eighteen cities;51 between the end
of the Civil War and the dawn of the twentieth century, it would open
branch offices in 120 new cities.52
As the agency evolved, so did its personnel and ownership: Tappan
withdrew from the firm, in part because his abolitionist activities had cost
the company business in the South.53  Robert Graham Dun took owner-
45. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 310-11.
46. The Mercantile Agency, supra note 25, at 50; SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 101.
47. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 311; see also OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 47
(noting the challenges of scaling in this context).
48. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 131.
49. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 311.
50. See Reports of the Four Leading Cases Against the Mercantile Agency for
Slander and Libel 187 (1873).
51. See id.
52. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 106.
53. See id. at 29-35.
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ship in 1859 and remained at the helm until 1900; during that period, the
Mercantile Agency’s parent company was R.G. Dun & Co.54  The post-
1859 entity was called by one or the other name depending on context; in
this paper, I’ll call it the “Mercantile Agency” for the sake of consistency.
Every time the Mercantile Agency opened a new branch, employees
hand-copied a new set of ledgers for that branch corresponding to the
existing master set.55  This presented a huge database replication prob-
lem56: As new reports came in, how were the branch-office ledgers to be
kept in sync with the master set in New York?  At the outset, correspon-
dents in the field sent their reports to New York, where employees first
transcribed them into bound volumes and then sent copies to the branch
offices.57  Later, the agency developed a system under which each report
from a correspondent came in to the nearest local office.  That office tran-
scribed the report into the ledgers there, sent a copy to New York, and
then sent the original report in succession to each of the branch offices
deemed to be interested in it.58
This was problematic in multiple ways.  It meant that updates were
slow to reach the branch offices (and never did reach some of them).  The
increasing volume of reports meant that hand-copying swallowed up in-
creasing amounts of time and money.  Ledgers in constant use became
tattered and had to be re-copied, again by hand, in their entirety.  Effec-
tive indexing and cross-referencing “proved almost impossible.”59
What saved the company was its adoption of bleeding-edge technol-
ogy: the mechanical typewriter.  The typewriter was first commercially sold
in the United States in 1874.  The initial model was awkward and lacked
such features as lower-case letters; its operator could not see the sheet be-
ing typed.60  Nonetheless, Dun ordered a trial immediately, and distrib-
uted typewriters to all branch offices in 1875.61  Its use in conjunction with
carbon paper meant that the Agency could easily generate and distribute
multiple copies of reports.  Carbon-paper duplicates were made using thin
tissue paper; an originating office distributed these “tissue” updates simul-
54. See FOULKE, supra note 7, at 295.  Ironically, while Tappan had lost busi-
ness because of his abolitionism, Dun was pro-slavery and a fierce racist. See OLE-
GARIO, supra note 12, at 60-61.
55. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 311.
56. See generally Brian Thomas Storti, A Primer on Database Replication, AL-
PHASIGHTS ENGINEERING (Aug. 11, 2017), https://m.alphasights.com/a-primer-on-
database-replication-381b319cd032 [https://perma.cc/6VDC-W57L] (addressing
this issue in a networked computing context).
57. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 24; OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 63.
58. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 136.
59. Id.
60. See Christopher Keep, The Introduction of the Sholes & Glidden Type-Writer,
1874, BRANCH, http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=christopher-keep-
the-introduction-of-the-sholes-glidden-type-writer-1874 [https://perma.cc/FX6P-
X7PG] (last visited July 21, 2018).
61. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 136.
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taneously to branches designated in a distribution table sent out from New
York.62  Under a new company-wide organizational system, the tissues did
not go into the large ledger books; rather, they were pasted onto manila
sheets organized by firm and filed by name and location.63
These typewritten reports soon became the core of the database, and
their production required the agency, even more, to apply “the principles
of mass production.”64  In the Mercantile Agency’s Chicago office, by
1896, database management required the efforts of “a little army of type-
writer girls and enough other employees to make a total of 200,”65 en-
gaged full-time in “copying, compiling, verifying, and filing.”66  Over time,
the firm’s network of clerks, reporters and paid correspondents made it
one of the largest private employers in the country.67
Through these efforts, the Mercantile Agency achieved something
new: the sale of information as a commodity.  In England as early as 1776,
merchants had banded together into cooperative societies sharing infor-
mation and trade gossip about frauds and bad debts; no money changed
hands except for member dues supporting the service.68  But this was not
that.  The credit reporting firm was not a cooperative venture sharing in-
formation with members; it was a for-profit one selling information to cus-
tomers.  It separated information about the borrower from the underlying
credit transaction, and transformed that information into intellectual
property, a commodity to be bought by anyone willing to pay the agency’s
62. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 136-38; OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 162.  It
remained the case that not all reports went to all branches; even the New York
office declined receipt of certain categories of reports it saw as disconnected from
the New York market. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 138.
63. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 138-39.
64. JESSE RAINSFORD SPRAGUE, THE ROMANCE OF CREDIT 111 (1943).  Sprague
was speaking not about typewriters, but about the Tappan company’s foundational
idea: producing and selling credit information on a nationwide basis through the
medium of a hierarchical firm in which individuals performed specialized
functions.
65. The U.S. Census listed 154 “stenographers and typists” in 1870; an esti-
mated 5,000 in 1880; more than 30,000 in 1890; and more than 110,000 in 1900.
But while stenographers in 1870 were almost entirely male, this category was more
than three-fourths female by 1900. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1940 Census:
Comparative Occupation Statistics, 1870-1940, at 112 https://www2.census.gov/prod
2/decennial/documents/00312147ch2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P92U-5RRN]; U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Twelfth Census: Statistics of Occupations, at 8 https://www2
.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1900/occupations/occupations-part-
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU7C-H3BS]; Donald Hoke, The Woman and the Type-
writer: A Case Study in Technological Innovation and Social Change 77, http://www
.thebhc.org/sites/default/files/beh/BEHprint/v008/p0076-p0088.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6VX3-TZ2N].
66. Lauer, supra note 11, at 312 (quoting The Mercantile Agencies: They Have
Grown Indispensable to Business, CHI. TRIB. Mar. 15, 1896, at 6).
67. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 61.
68. See id. at 32-34.
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prices.  Network effects drove it to continual efforts to expand its reach,
and economies of scale made that expansion possible.69
Scott Sandage reports that the word “information” came to take on a
new shade of meaning in the later nineteenth century, referring to author-
itative knowledge that could be sold like any other good.70  That usage
reflected the changed nature of economic production in the new econ-
omy.  Consider an 1879 journalist’s positive report about the Mercantile
Agency’s then-rival, the Bradstreet Company71: The firm, he reported, had
a “great beehive of a business room” in its main office with over a hundred
clerks, but even more saliently, it had more than 1200 employees nation-
wide.  Yes, there existed larger firms—“factories, machine shops, and the
like”—but “how many private corporations are there which require the
services of a thousand brain workers?”72
B. The Dissemination of Credit Information
I’ve not yet addressed a crucial set of issues: how was this information
in the database to be communicated to subscribers?  Indeed, what infor-
mation would subscribers receive?  Initially, the Mercantile Agency pro-
vided information to subscribers only orally, and only at one of its offices.
The subscriber would present himself at the office—in person or through
the agency of a designated “confidential clerk”—and submit a ticket of
inquiry identifying the individual regarding whom he sought information.
A page boy would retrieve the appropriate ledger.  That book would be set
down “on the inside of a raised desk,” at “an angle of about 40 or 45 de-
grees,” so that the subscriber could not see its contents.73  An employee
would then read the relevant ledger entry aloud, allowing the subscriber
to take notes.74
69. See id. at 76-79.
70. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 162.
71. See supra note 16.
72. Lauer, supra note 11, at 313 (quoting Business Credits, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 28, 1879, at 7).
73. Bill of Exceptions, Beardsley v. Tappan (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (testimony of
Thomas Lawrence, Jr.), printed in REPORTS, supra note 50; see OLEGARIO, supra note
12, at 58; SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 161-62.
74. The Mercantile Agency subscriber agreement provided that “the informa-
tion on the books of the Agency . . . will be read at the office of said Agency to
subscribers . . . .” See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 147. Witnesses testifying in early
libel cases described the same procedure. See Bill of Exceptions, Beardsley, 2 F. Cas.
1187 (testimony of David L. Moore) (“[T]he clerk read [the entry] very slowly and
distinctly, and I wrote it down carefully with a pencil”), printed in REPORTS, supra
note 50, at 21; Billings v. Russell, (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1855) (merchants “had heard
reports read from the books of the office by the defendant’s clerk”), printed in
REPORTS, supra note 50, at 130; see also Barry Cohen & Bruce G. Carruthers, The
Risk of Rating: Negotiating Trust and Responsibility in 19th Century Credit Information,
93 SOCIE´TE´S CONTEMPORAINES 39, 45-46 (2014).  That policy, though, doesn’t ap-
pear to have been consistently adhered to.  Cohen and Carruthers report that it
was relaxed in the late 1860s. See id. at 46 n.5.  As early as 1856, a witness in Ormsby
v. Douglass reported that clerks usually provided him reports in writing. See RE-
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The entries in the ledger books were unstandardized, and took vary-
ing forms.75  Sometimes they were stenographic and just-the-facts; some-
times they incorporated literary flourishes or even jokes.  In one case, a
correspondent wrote of Thomas Smythe that the way he spelled his name
looked “suspicious”—was he “afraid to acknowledge himself a ‘Smith’?”76
Reports might recognize conflicting judgments or bits of informa-
tion.77  A person could be described as “indus[trious] & money making,
but somewhat inclined to dissipation,” or “steady and honest” but “unless I
am mistaken he will make many bad debts.”78  A report on a Massachusetts
shoemaker in a single sentence noted “[m]atters seem to have turned out
well, there was a report of [his] doing badly.”79  As it happens, though,
that judgment was premature.  An update soon added: “hung himself—
cause unknown—many think Embarr[asse]d circumst[ance]s.”80
Not only did the ledger entries contain sometimes-inconsistent infor-
mation evaluating their subjects along incommensurable axes, but the
Mercantile Agency stressed that all of that information had to be conveyed
to subscribers if they were to make credit decisions properly.  In an 1860
circular, thus, the company urged that it would be “injurious” for it to
prepare written reports on its data subjects, because the employee prepar-
ing the report would be required to edit and condense, privileging some
facts and leaving out others.81  That would be bad, because the ledger
entries, updated over the course of a subject’s career, contained “so many
points to be considered, that different minds would form different impressions.
Clerks might form an opinion that the subscriber would not.”82  Accord-
ingly, the subscriber “should have the Records read to him, bringing his
own mind to bear on the subject.”83
No set of ledger entries could possibly have told the entire story of
any business person’s character, capacity, and connections.  We are all
PORTS, supra note 50, at 153.  An 1856 journalist’s account is in accord. See Lauer,
supra note 11, at 310.  By 1881, it appears, at least some Mercantile Agency offices,
upon receiving updated information about a business of interest to customers, sim-
ply delivered written copies of the new information to those customers’ offices. See
Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214, 215 (C.C.D. Md. 1882).
75. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 46-47.
76. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 155-56.
77. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 156.
78. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 150, 152.
79. Id. at 130.
80. Id.
81. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 45.  This claim wasn’t free from
self-interest.  The Agency sought to keep its information confidential to avoid free-
riding, and it sought to avoid liability for defamation; disseminating written reports
undercut both of those goals. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.  Com-
petitive pressures, nonetheless, led the agency to begin issuing written reports on a
regular basis in the 1870s. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 59.
82. OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 116.
83. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 46 (emphasis in original); OLE-
GARIO, supra note 12, at 116 (emphasis in original).
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complicated.  Our stories require more than a paragraph or two, and the
very act of pulling local gossip out of its initial social context and transcrib-
ing it into a ledger book leaves its import unclear and incomplete.84  Josh
Lauer has borrowed the word “textualization” to refer to the credit agen-
cies’ process of reproducing embodied lives in the form of flat disem-
bodied text;85 any such translation necessarily requires reducing and
simplifying, selecting particular facts from the swamp of real-life experi-
ence.86  The Mercantile Agency textualized its data subjects’ lives in order
to create disembodied credit evaluations that it could then sell to its cus-
tomers.  At least at the outset, though, its approach seemed to reflect the
understanding that lives were messy and could be captured in text only
through narrative that might be messy in its turn.87
In 1857, though, a competing credit bureau—the Bradstreet Com-
pany88—introduced a new product that changed the rules of the game.  It
provided its subscribers with a bound reference book that contained no
narrative; instead, its hundred-plus pages included coded credit informa-
tion in the form of rating keys.89  The change was momentous.  No more
did subscribers need to call at a central office to hear a long narrative
report; the rating summed the situation up, and it was all contained in the
book.  The innovation was hugely popular, and pulled hundreds of sub-
scribers from the Mercantile Agency to the Bradstreet camp.90
The Mercantile Agency responded negatively to the Bradstreet ratings
books.  With no facts published to support a firm’s naked ratings, a ratings
book subscriber had no way of knowing whether they were sound or based
on solid information.  Its rival, the Mercantile Agency suspected, sold rat-
84. See LAUER, supra note 12, at 38-39.
85. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 310 n.11.
86. See Lipartito, supra note 43, at 34-36; SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 135.
87. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 130.
88. See supra note 16.
89. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 65-67.  The Bradstreet codes, at the outset,
still referenced the sort of judgments that might have found its way into narrative
ratings.  In addition to providing an overall rating of A (“Good for any amount
required”) through E (“Fair for small lines”), an entry might include one or more
of thirty numerically-coded notes such as 12 (“Does not attend very closely to busi-
ness”), 18 (“Not very good private character”), or 30 (“Rather slow pay”). See id. at
66-67; see also Bruce Carruthers & Barry Cohen, Credit, Classification, and Cognition:
Credit Raters in 19th-Century America (Oct. 20, 2009), at 9-10 (emphasizing the limi-
tations of Bradstreet’s ratings system); Lipartito, supra note 43, at 12-13 (character-
izing Bradstreet’s ratings as simply shorthand narrative).
90. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 67.  The Bradstreet Company starting four
years earlier had experimented with distributing ratings sheets not bound in
books; the sheets listed information including dollar estimates of merchants’ real
estate and capital.  Those estimates were absent from the later ratings books; the
company may have shied from the task of maintaining current estimates suffi-
ciently reliable to publish, and may have become uncomfortable exposing to the
public information it considered proprietary. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note
89, at 9-10.
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ings to obscure the fact that it had insufficient resources to conduct busi-
ness properly.91
Nonetheless, competitive pressure drove the Mercantile Agency to is-
sue its own 519-page ratings book in 1859.92  Ratings books in subscribers’
hands, of course, could not update themselves, and thus began falling out
of date as soon as they were issued.  The Bradstreet firm, to take account
of new information that became available between editions, sent out peri-
odic notification sheets with new information.  The Mercantile Agency,
initially, signaled the arrival of new information about data subjects by
placing a coded notice in the newspaper.  Interested subscribers, seeing
the notice, could then go to the agency office to get the news.93  Later on,
it initiated a practice of sending Notices of Invitation to subscribers who
had expressed interest in a particular company to visit the office to receive
new information about that company.94
The Mercantile Agency’s 1859 ratings book coded businesses on a
one-dimensional scale, with eight steps ranging from A No. 1 (“credit un-
limited”), No. 1 (“Unquestioned”), and 1 1/2 (“Strong”), down through 3
(“Fair”) to the depths of 3 1/2 and 4, which had no corresponding text.
The eight steps were actually twenty, since a rating could have a + or –
attached.95  The agency offered in the ratings book no narrative and no
hints explaining why any firm had received the rating it had; if subscribers
wanted more information, they needed to seek it out in the firm’s ledger
entries at the agency offices.96
The agency maintained its discomfort with ratings, though.  It cau-
tioned, in the prefaces to its 1860s and 1870s ratings books, that ratings—
unlike reports—couldn’t capture the “numberless circumstances” influ-
encing a credit decision, and couldn’t describe businesses in their infinite
variety.97  The ledger books, it emphasized, provided subscribers with the
facts that they needed for proper decision; by contrast, the ratings books
existed “only as an aid for immediate reference, and where prompt deci-
sion is required.”  Relying on the ratings books as a substitute for the
ledger entries, the company continued, doubled a subscriber’s risk.  Sub-
scribers who engaged in that practice “should not blame the Agency”
when things went wrong.98
91. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 89, at 43, 56.
92. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 68.
93. See id. at 69.
94. See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 18-21.
95. The “4” rating, however, was not actually used. See Carruthers & Cohen,
supra note 89, at 14-15, 20 n.3.
96. See id. at 15.
97. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 56-57.
98. See id.; see also OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 153.  The company’s message
was not always consistent.  An (atypical) 1866 advertising circular reprinted reviews
of its rating system describing it as allowing the subscriber to see “at a glance” the
information in the company’s office records, “condensed” into a single code.  The
suggestion there was that the Agency had done all the hard work relating to the
14
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There was certainly reason for caution when it came to ratings.  Rat-
ings were simple, unequivocal, and orderly; they presented themselves as
facts.99  But there was no way for the subscriber to know what had gone
into them, nor were they generated according to rule.  On the contrary,
the process appears to have been both unsystematic and arbitrary.100  The
ledger reports on which the ratings were based consisted of a jumble of ad
hoc, subjective, equivocal, and disorganized narrative information of vary-
ing reliability and insight.101  Even such matters as estimates of net worth
were subjective and subject to interpretation.102  So how was the agency
usefully to translate that to a single, opaque, code?
The credit bureaus’ generation of ratings necessarily suppressed the
inconsistency and ambiguity of the ledger reports.  Shades of meaning and
thick description disappeared; so did consideration of the reliability of
particular information sources.  There was no room for analysis, say, of
whether a firm was more likely to be creditworthy in its relationship with
some firms than with others.  And there was no indication whether a firm’s
creditworthiness appeared to be rising or falling over time.103
Nonetheless, consumers wanted ratings; as the credit bureaus gained
more experience, they began to adjust their ratings formats in an attempt
to make them more useful.  The Mercantile Agency in 1864 shifted from a
one-dimensional to a two-dimensional system, rating companies separately
for “pecuniary strength” and “general credit.”104  The idea here was that a
business owner could have extensive financial resources but poor charac-
ter, or sterling character but limited resources; failing to distinguish the
two would work injustice.105  The double-rating scheme turned out to
credit decision, leaving users free simply to rely on the ratings. See Cohen & Car-
ruthers, supra note 74, at 45.
99. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 304-05; Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 41, at
27.
100. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 8.
101. See id.
102. See Lipartito, supra note 43, at 14.  No standardized accounting method-
ology yet existed; GAAP rules weren’t developed until after the stock market crash
of 1929.  Indeed, professional accountants didn’t yet exist. See Carruthers & Co-
hen, supra note 41, at 26 n.31.
103. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 41, at 28-29.
104. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 18-19.  The new Mercantile
Agency system classed each firm’s “pecuniary strength” as falling into one of seven
broad bands, starting at A1+ (“$1,000,000 or over) and progressing through 2
($50,000 to $100,000) down through 3 1/2 ($5,000 to 10,000”).  It classed the
firm’s “general credit” along a similar seven-step metric, from A1 (“Unlimited”) to
3 and 3 1/2 (“Fair”). See id.
105. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 153.  As a practical matter, it would not
be wise to make a very large loan to a small firm, even one of impeccable charac-
ter.  Assigning that firm a low rating on a one-dimensional scale, though, would
not recognize its proprietor’s honesty, reliability, and fine reputation.  As Dunn
explained in a letter, “[o]ne man possesses of large means may have comparatively
poor credit arising from peculiar causes, while, on the contrary, another with small
means may have what might be called a disproportionately good credit.  One col-
15
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have its own problems, though.  Were the two scores independent judg-
ments of capitalization and character, or was “pecuniary strength” an in-
put to the “general credit” bottom line?106  To address that ambiguity, the
agency unveiled yet another ratings scheme in 1882.  The new ratings sys-
tem incorporated not only a 15-step “estimated pecuniary strength” score
and an independent high/good/fair/limited score for “general credit,”
but an explicit algorithm for combining the two into a single one-dimen-
sional rating.107
At the same time as the Agency was searching for ways to manipulate
its constituent scores, it was struggling with challenges in calculating those
scores.  Headquarters personnel appear to have been frustrated by the
dual challenges of articulating policies for ratings clerks in the field to
follow, and ensuring that clerks in fact adhered to those policies.108  Head-
quarters routinely sent out directives to the field admonishing personnel
to keep ratings better synced with ledger information, and warning raters
against over-reacting to new ledger information and under-scoring small
firms.  Headquarters insisted to branch managers that they should place a
higher priority on the accuracy of their ratings.  Problems, however,
persisted.109
Nor was the Mercantile Agency the only firm facing these challenges.
The Bradstreet Company also repeatedly adjusted its ratings methodology.
In 1864, it adjusted its initial system to be more granular, with eleven rank-
ordered categories but without textual notes; by 1873 it too had made the
choice to reflect financial strength separately from credit, albeit in a con-
fusing and less-than-fully-helpful way.110  In 1882, Bradstreet once again
switched to a system similar to its rival’s, in which an algorithm combined
independent “Estimated Wealth” and “Credit” scores into a single six-step
rating.111
umn of ratings cannot express these peculiarities with sufficient pliancy . . . .”  Car-
ruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 17-18 (quoting Letter from R.G. Dunn to
Erastus Wiman (Mar. 30, 1864)).
106. The firm took some steps suggesting the latter: It instructed branch man-
agers to “keep the credit markings in close relation to the capital marking,” and
forbidding “absurd” rankings that paired weak pecuniary strength with strong gen-
eral credit. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 156-57; NORRIS, supra note 16, at 93; see
also Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 23.  That approach made sense only if
one understood the “general credit” ranking to depend in part on capitalization,
so that it would anomalous for a highly-capitalized firm to have low general credit,
and impossible for a poorly-capitalized one to have high general credit.
107. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 22-25.
108. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Bureaucracy as Violence, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1097, 1106 (2017) (“One of the central challenges for any bureaucracy is how to
ensure that line personnel at the bottom implement policy decisions made at the
top.”).
109. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 50-53, 60; Carruthers & Cohen,
supra note 41, at 21.
110. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 10-13.
111. The Mercantile Agency and Bradstreet approaches worked differently.
Under the Mercantile Agency’s algorithm, it was impossible for a firm with over a
16
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In 1864, the Mercantile Agency ratings book had 120,000 entries. In
1870, that number was 430,000; in 1880, it was 760,000; in 1890, it was
1,180,000.112 Over that time period, we can see the credit agencies making
continual adjustments, seeking to find a way successfully to compress the
complex story of individuals’ and firms’ credit-worthiness.  Credit ratings
were a classification schema, and classification necessarily involves simplifi-
cation—but how was it to be done?  At one point, the Mercantile Agency
provided different ratings to different classes of subscribers (so that differ-
ent ratings were sent to “bankers” than to “manufacturers and jobbers”),
on the theory that their credit-evaluation needs were different; later, it
dropped that approach.113  Both major firms made their “pecuniary
strength” category more granular as time went on, to meet consumer de-
mand.  They didn’t make any changes in the broad-brush, more subjective
“general credit” category, though, nor did they reveal in the ratings books
any of the underlying information that went into that latter calculation.114
It’s easy to imagine that the story of movement from narrative to nu-
merical representation was one of movement to harder, more scientific
data.115  But when one flattens a rich, factual representation, that necessa-
rily means that one’s information becomes more shallow.  That can be
useful if the shallow information turns out to have strong predictive value.
But it’s systematically vulnerable in contexts where the particular informa-
tion one has selected, or one’s mechanism for aggregating it, turns out not
to have good predictive power.116  Moreover, if the method for doing the
flattening isn’t mechanical, then boiling down thick reality into summary
form requires an exercise of judgment by some (likely low-level) em-
ployee.  That poses additional risk, since that judgment can be exercised
badly, or—even more saliently—inconsistently from one employee to the
next.
One preliminary study, not too long ago, examined Chicago dry
goods retailers in 1877, seeking an answer to the $64,000 question: was
there was any relationship between a firm’s Mercantile Agency ratings and
the likelihood of its failure over the next seven years?117  The authors
million dollars in capitalization, no matter how bad its credit, to get an overall
rating of less than “2.” Under Bradstreet’s approach, by contrast, even a very large
firm could get the lowest overall rating.  This difference, though, may have been
more apparent than real: Both firms were more likely to withdraw a listing than to
give a large and prominent merchant an egregiously low score for general credit.
The two major credit bureaus had in common that less-well capitalized firms were
excluded from the higher ratings. See id. at 23-26.
112. See NORRIS, supra note 16, at 110.
113. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 74, at 55.
114. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 27-29.
115. See Lipartito, supra note 43, at 1.
116. See id. at 35-36.
117. A firm was coded as having failed if it went bankrupt, was sued on its
debts, or had to negotiate an extension or settlement of its debts.  Relatively few of
the firms in the sample turned out to satisfy that criterion—only 16 out of 247. See
Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 43, at 38–40.
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found that there was not.  Neither “pecuniary strength” nor “general
credit” showed any significant correlation with likelihood of short-term
failure.118  A customer solely relying on ratings would be none the wiser in
his quest to know which of those firms would pay its debts, and which
would default.
Ironically, the authors of the study found other information in the
ledgers that did show such a correlation.  If a firm’s ledger entry noted that
it was slow to pay, it turned out to be significantly more likely to fail; so
were firms explicitly noted as refusing to provide the agency with a finan-
cial statement.119  The agency thus—had it known what to look for—
could have extracted ledger information in such a way as to provide a
usefully predictive rating.  But the exercise of flattening and simplifying
reality, to squeeze it all into a database, turned out to be a difficult one.
The Mercantile Agency constructed a massive surveillance apparatus, and
by 1886 had added more than a million data subjects to its files.  It
changed its ratings format repeatedly. But it faced obstacles in reducing its
lengthy ledger information to a useful shorthand.120
III. PRIVACY, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE MERCANTILE AGENCY
It won’t be surprising that Tappan’s innovation drew extensive oppo-
sition and criticism.  Many in the business press welcomed the credit bu-
reaus.121  By 1886, the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette explained that
mercantile agencies were simply a necessity; they were “in keeping with
the advanced ideas of the business community, which demands tele-
graphs, telephones, lightning express trains—in fact everything that will
enable them to transact business securely and rapidly.”122
But many others did not.  The small retailers who were the targets of
the credit agencies’ attentions looked on them with deep resentment.123
Some journalists attacked the credit agencies as establishing a pervasive
surveillance of public and private life, an “organized system of espio-
118. See id. at 43–44.
119. See id. at 44.
120. See id. at 48.
121. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 164-66 (noting an 1870s CHICAGO TIMES
article describing credit reporting as “a great service to business interests”); see, e.g.,
Mercantile Miscellanies—Commercial Agencies, HUNT’S MERCHANT’S MAG. & COM.
REV., Aug. 1, 1856, at 260 (mercantile agencies are still in their infancy, but ideally
will grow to “know everything that can be known about everybody in trade”) (em-
phasis in original); The Mercantile Agency, HUNT’S MERCHANT’S MAG. & COM. REV.,
Jan. 24, 1851, at 46, 48 (describing the Tappan agency in hagiographic terms).
122. See JOSEPH W. ERRANT, THE LAW RELATING TO MERCANTILE AGENCIES 43
(1889).  Positive reactions were especially easy to find after the mid-1880s; before
that, negative ones were more common. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 41, at
21-24.
123. See Lauer, supra note 11, at 322.
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nage”124 from which no home was secure.125  Even a notable proponent
of the credit monitoring system mused that that system, with “inquisitorial
functions [that] naturally arouse antagonism,” was unique to the United
States: “it is paradoxical, the free citizen of the United States is the only
one on the face of the globe who tolerates it.”126
Opponents described credit-related surveillance as humiliating and
hostile to human dignity.127  The credit agencies, they urged, treated
nothing as off-limits; nothing was too private or personal.  With correspon-
dents collecting local gossip, “[n]eighbor will doubt neighbor & fear will
check social intercourse.”128  If business owners didn’t conform to their
overseers’ understanding of good business character and conduct, they
would suffer consequences: any slip-up on their parts would be reflected
in the credit-bureau books.  And there was no escaping it—for ordinary
people, mercantile-agency surveillance meant a profound loss of control
over their own lives. As an 1853 critic wrote:
Your character . . . is circulated by post and telegraph, east, west,
north, south; while you are pursuing the equal tenor of your life,
you have become notorious for something. A thousand folios in-
clude a page or more about you and your affairs, without your
knowledge or your consent.  Go where you may to purchase
goods, a character has proceeded you, either for your benefit or
your destruction.129
Moreover, as the data subjects were well aware, the agencies judging
them were hardly infallible.  An 1853 book of business advice asked:
“[W]hat man, whose credit is his bread, does not feel anxious to know
whether he has been misrepresented or not?”  The system was “fraught
with danger.”  The “life and soul” of the mercantile community—its
credit—was subject to the whims of “a few men, self-constituted umpires,
and their unknown and irresponsible agents, subject to the errors of igno-
rance and mistakes of carelessness, with no guaranteed exemption from
the influence of private malice, favoritism, bribery or corruption.”130  One
124. See id. (quoting GEORGE G. FOSTER, NEW YORK NAKED 119 (New York
1850)).
125. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 70.
126. P.R. EARLING, WHOM TO TRUST: A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON MERCANTILE
CREDITS 302-03 (1890), available at https://archive.org/details/whomtotrus-
tapra00earlgoog [https://perma.cc/5S5X-DDW6].
127. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 56; see also id. at 71 (describing an 1869
author’s efforts to urge that a retailer’s submitting evidence of his finances and
character to obtain credit was not in fact “mean, cringing or contemptible”).
128. Id. at 70.
129. Traits of Trade—Laudable and Iniquitous, 29 HUNT’S MERCHANTS’ MAG. &
COM. REV., Jul. 1853, at 50 (quoted in SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 184, and Lauer,
supra note 11, at 320).
130. See Edwin Freedly, A Practical Treatise on Business: Or How to Get, Save,
Spend, Give, Lend, and Bequeath Money: With an Inquiry into the Chances of Success and
Causes of Failure in Business 130-131 (1853) (cited in OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at
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prominent critic emphasized that a credit bureau’s lack of transparency
meant that defects in the information it provided would not be easily dis-
covered; as such, it was “an enterprise which possesses the coercive power of
rating every man in the community as its managers or clerks may see fit.”131  The
poisonous information in a business owner’s file, suggested another critic,
might come from “an insidious enemy”—but woe betide the person trying
to convince the credit bureaucracy to correct its error.132
In several states, legislators offered bills to restrain credit-bureau activ-
ities.  In particular, a Pennsylvania bill would have made it a criminal of-
fense for any credit agency or representative to “knowingly heedlessly or
wilfully [sic] exaggerate or misrepresent” information relating to a person
engaged in commercial business.133  A Minnesota bill took a different ap-
proach: it prohibited a person’s making false statements to a credit bureau
or its agents relating to “the solvency or insolvency, and amount or valua-
tion of property, the financial condition, or . . . the business ability, moral
character, honesty or integrity” of any person or firm in the state.134  The
Mercantile Agency’s judgment was that that latter bill “would effectually
bar Agency business in that State if passed.”135  The Agency lobbied
against both bills, though, and neither was enacted.136
The reactions of nineteenth-century observers to the Mercantile
Agency mirrored the sort of privacy concerns that activists raise today in
response to contemporary data privacy issues.  We are painfully aware in
our day that major Internet actors, data fusion companies, and indeed
credit bureaus have assembled profiles on nearly every adult American.
When we conduct our lives on the Internet, we leave snippets of informa-
tion about our purchases, our browsing habits, and much else for others to
228 n.125 and in SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 154); see also Lauer, supra note 11, at
314-15.
131. THOMAS MEAGHER, THE COMMERCIAL AGENCY “SYSTEM” OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA EXPOSED 25 (1876) (emphasis in original), https://archive
.org/stream/commercialagency00meagiala [https://perma.cc/3EDS-EJ3L].
132. Traits of Trade, supra note 129, at 52.
133. MEAGHER, supra note 131, at 81-82.
134. See H. JOURNAL, 29th Sess., at 825 (Minn. 1895).
135. Marc Flandreau & Gabriel Geisler Mesevage, The Untold History of Trans-
parency: Mercantile Agencies, the Law, and the Lawyers (1851-1916), 15 ENTERPRISE &
SOC’Y 213, 223 n.34 (2014).
136. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 170.  Other bills were directed at other
evils.  Bills in the U.S. Congress, Illinois, and North Dakota were directed at firms
simultaneously serving as credit bureaus and collection agencies. See H.R. 3355,
55th Cong., 1st Sess. (1897); It Affects Commercial Agencies, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1895,
at 12; Aimed at the Agencies, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1891, at 6; Lauer, supra note 11, at
317 n.64.  Bills were introduced in Pennsylvania, Missouri and Ottawa (Canada) to
make credit agencies liable to subscribers for losses resulting from inaccurate infor-
mation. See Lauer, supra note 22, at 317 n.64; OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 170.
South Dakota enacted a law requiring mercantile agencies to register with the state
before collecting information on state residents, and imposing a 2% tax on income
growing out of their activities in the state. See State v. Morgan, 48 N.W. 314, 315
(S.D. 1891).
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collect and organize: Google and Facebook know more about us than our
family members do.  Government surveillance is widespread, and govern-
ment databases—from local license listings to the FBI’s Known or Sus-
pected Terrorist file—have proliferated as well.
Privacy advocates, addressing these issues today, have articulated con-
cerns about pervasive surveillance; about our own loss of control in the
face of that surveillance; and about the fact that powerful institutions are
now making decisions affecting our lives based on impersonal and ill-fit-
ting database entries.137  All of those are concerns that I referred to in the
initial pages of this Article, discussing the Equifax data breach.  But none
of them are new: All were expressed starting in the 1840s, when members
of the American public first began learning to live with the Mercantile
Agency.
The underlying problem, indeed, was the same then as now.  The pri-
vacy problem in the modern age, as Jeffrey Reiman put it more than
twenty years ago, isn’t that our doors and curtains aren’t insufficiently
thick; it’s the way modern databases “gather[ ] up the pieces” of our lives
and make them all “visible from a single point.”138  The collection and
aggregation of information about our everyday activities in the public eye
can reveal aspects of our identities in a way susceptible to abuse.139  But
that modern problem presented itself in the 1840s, when the Mercantile
Agency began compiling its ledgers.
We can put the nineteenth-century credit bureau in broader perspec-
tive by looking at it in terms of Michel Foucault’s description of the phe-
nomenon he called disciplinary writing.  “For a long time,” Foucault
wrote, “ordinary individuality—the everyday individuality of everybody—
remained below the threshold of description . . . [t]o be looked at, ob-
served, described in detail, followed from day to day by an uninterrupted
writing, was a privilege,” reserved for kings and heroes.140
But that, Foucault continued, was no longer the case.  Modern institu-
tions embody surveillance that makes ordinary individuals visible at all
times.  That surveillance situates people in “a network of writing; it en-
gages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them.”141
To accomplish that goal, institutions have had to formulate codes to tran-
scribe the individual features noted by the surveillance; to correlate those
137. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGO-
RITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION ERA (2004).
138. Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 29 (1995); see also Jonathan Weinberg, Tracking RFID,
3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 777, 814 (2007-08).
139. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
140. Michel Foucault, The Means of Correct Training, in THE FOUCAULT READER
189, 203 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984 (Alan Sheridan, trans., 1977)).
141. Id. at 201.
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elements within an organized, sortable accumulation of documents; to “in-
tegrate individual data into cumulative systems in such a way that . . . an
individual could be located in the general register;” and thus ultimately to
constitute the individual within the database as “a describable, analyzable
object.”142
Finally, Foucault emphasized, this process is an instrument of judg-
ment and punishment.  It achieves, as Foucault put it, “the subjection of
those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are
subjected.”143
It should hardly be necessary to show how closely this narrative was
echoed in the rise of the credit bureau.  The credit bureau’s first task was
surveillance: it set itself the job of finding out the character, capacity and
capital of every individual business owner in the teeming, geographically
scattered mass that was the American economy.  These firms, for the most
part, were individual proprietorships or small partnerships; the informa-
tion the credit bureau collected was thus information about the personal
characteristics and dealings of everyday people.  It extended to such mat-
ters as the notation in one report that a subject Ohio druggist had become
“too well acquainted” with a married woman whose husband had left to
join the California Gold Rush.144  This was an unprecedented thing: “Or-
dinary Americans had never before inspired big books of their comings,
goings, hits, and misses.”145
The second component, as I’ve discussed, was the credit bureaus’ de-
velopment of protocols and technology to situate their reports and ledger
information in databases, such that any business proprietor could be “lo-
cated in the general register,” described, and coded with a rating.
And as for the third component, the key function of the credit bu-
reau, in Foucault’s words, was to “differentiate[ ] and judge[ ]”146—with
the effect of punishing those business owners who didn’t measure up.
Credit bureau ledger entries described some Americans as “A no. 1” and
others as “losers”—as “good for nothing”—and on that basis subscribers
chose to do business with them or to shun them.147  This provided a
profound incentive for business owners to internalize the credit bureaus’
ratings criteria, and alter their behavior to match those standards.  Be-
cause a credit bureau would publicize every case in which a merchant
failed to pay his debts when due, an 1896 reporter mused, it “might well
be termed a bureau for the promotion of honesty.”148  And indeed, that’s
part of what Lewis Tappan had intended.  An abolitionist leader and a
142. Id. at 201-02.
143. Id. at 197.
144. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 155.
145. Id. at 130.
146. FOUCAULT, supra note 140, at 197.
147. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 133.
148. Lauer, supra note 11, at 312 (citing The Mercantile Agencies: They Have
Grown Indispensable to Business, CHI. TRIB. 6 (March 15, 1896)); see also SANDAGE,
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deeply moralistic man,149 Tappan saw his company as one that would
“check[ ] knavery, & purif[y] the mercantile air.”150  He welcomed the
discipline it imposed on traders.151
While contemporary critics’ fears of “espionage” sound like modern
privacy concerns, those critics did not have the tools or the vocabulary to
couch their privacy complaints as legal claims.152  Warren and Brandeis’s
ground-breaking right to privacy article would not be published until
1890,153 and it would be decades more before any court recognized a pri-
vacy-based tort claim based on something other than the reproduction of
a plaintiff’s visual likeness.154  Federal statutory law would not address
credit reporting until 1970.155  Nineteenth-century business proprietors
were not positioned to address surveillance as a legal harm, or even to
think about it in those terms.156
But they were positioned to level one straightforward attack against
credit bureaus: the common-law defamation suit.  To the extent that dam-
aging errors were inevitable in agency operations—and they were—one
would expect injured parties to file claims for defamation.  This was long
before the Supreme Court constitutionalized defamation law in New York
Times v. Sullivan.157  In those far-away, pre-1964 times, states followed com-
mon-law defamation rules under which speakers faced strict liability for
supra note 7, at 163 (citing The Mercantile Agency System, 7 THE BANKERS’ MAG. &
STAT. 545 (Jan. 1858)).
149. Tappan had “a habit of coming to unfavorable conclusions about men
on too slight grounds.” See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 41 (emphasis in original).
He fit well, according to his biographer, into “the familiar checklist of the Yankee
do-gooder’s grave defects: moral arrogance, obstinacy, cliquish conformity, [and]
provincial bigotry.” See id. at 40-41 (quoting BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN
AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR AGAINST SLAVERY 231, 237 (1997 reprint ed.)).
150. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 148 (quoting a letter Tappan wrote to his
nephew).
151. See id. at 163.
152. One 1889 lawyer did argue to the New York Court of Appeals that “[t]he
name and business of appellant being peculiarly his own private property, [a credit
bureau] had no right to voluntarily print and circulate any publication of or con-
cerning his name or business.”  Kingsbury v. The Bradstreet Co., 116 N.Y. 211, 213
(N.Y. 1889).  Counsel was unable to cite any relevant authority, though, and the
claim was foreclosed by relevant precedent. See infra notes 208-220 and accompa-
nying text.  The Court of Appeals did not bother to respond.
153. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
154. Or, in one case, the erection of a statue of plaintiff’s decedent. See Ben-
jamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s the Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right
to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 638-43 (2002).
155. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x).
156. See generally William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980-81) (examin-
ing the process through which injurious experiences do or don’t come to be seen
as the appropriate subjects of legal disputes).
157. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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defamation unless their speech was privileged.  So how did the courts—
and the agencies themselves—handle lawsuits against the agencies?158
IV. THE CREDIT AGENCY IN COURT
A. Setting the Stage
Let’s begin by looking at two early lawsuits, both of which went to trial
in 1851.  The first of them—Taylor v. Church159—was brought against Shel-
don Church.  Church had provided a fore-glimpse of the broadly-focused,
subscription-based, centrally-organized Mercantile Agency: as early as
1827, he had initiated a side business of recording credit information on
his travels through the South, and passing it along to clients in New
York.160  In the early 1840s, he was hired by a New York merchants’ associ-
ation.161  The association gave Church the names of some of its member
firms’ customers, whom he was tasked to investigate; Church sent reports
on those names back to the association, where they were printed for distri-
bution to the membership.162
In fulfilling those duties, Church wrote to his client in 1846 that one
Murdock, a Mississippi businessman, lacked the “essential requisites of a
good merchant;” that Murdock’s partner Hale was “rather a negative char-
acter;” and that their partner Taylor sent out “undesirable, ill assorted
odds and ends and unsaleable stock . . . I am told [he] is an unprincipled
character.”163  The report was printed and distributed to the association’s
thirty-odd members.164 Murdock, Hale, and Taylor sued for libel.
It’s useful here to review the general outlines of the tort of defama-
tion as it then existed.  As a rule, under mid-nineteenth century U.S. law, a
person who disseminated false and defamatory material was strictly liable
to the person defamed.  In some cases, though, a defendant was deemed
to have spoken “upon a just occasion,”165 so that he had legal excuse for
the defamatory speech.166  In a narrow set of circumstances, such as the
158. Some otherwise-exemplary scholarship suggests that after an initial pe-
riod of uncertainty, the law adopted a rule of privilege that routinely and easily
shielded credit bureaus from liability. See, e.g., OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 170;
SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 184, 315 n.18.  The reality, though, is different. See infra
Section III; Flandreu & Mesevage, supra note 135; Cohen & Carruthers, supra note
74, at 58; Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 41, at 54.
159. 1 E.D. Smith 279 (N.Y. Ct. Common Pleas 1851), rev’d, 8 N.Y. 452 (1853).
160. See SPRAGUE, supra note 64, at 111.
161. See FOULKE, supra note 7, at 332-34.
162. See Taylor v. Church, 8 N.Y. 452, 453 (1853).
163. Id. at 452.
164. See id. at 454.
165. FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 342 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1859) (emphasis omitted), https://books.google.com/
books?id=wWcLAAAAYAA.
166. See THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 209-10 (Callaghan and Company
1st ed. 1879).
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offering of judicial testimony, an individual’s statements would be abso-
lutely privileged; no liability could attach.  In a broader set of contexts,
courts found qualified privilege, on the ground that otherwise fear of an
honest mistake would cause speakers to self-censor, disserving the public
interest.167  Qualified privilege meant a defendant would be liable only if
he had spoken with “express” or “actual” malice—that is, out of wicked,
spiteful, or revengeful motives, with the intent to injure.168
Qualified privilege could arise in a variety of contexts.  An 1845 Su-
preme Court case had noted that the privilege was available “whenever the
author and publisher of the alleged slander acted in the bona fide dis-
charge of a public or private duty, legal or moral.”169  For example, privi-
lege covered a negative report of a teacher’s character made by a patron
of a school to its trustees, or the statements of a person whom a concerned
father had hired to learn his son-in-law’s true character.170  It covered cau-
tionary statements spoken in confidence and friendship, and the refer-
ences given by a householder attesting to the character of a servant he had
employed.171
It fit well with those principles for a court to hold—in the words of
one English judge—that if one business owner asks another in confidence
about “the solvency of a third person, whom the inquirer was about to
trust,” then the response to that inquiry would be protected by privilege.
If such communications are not protected by the law from the
danger of vexatious litigation in cases where they turn out to be
incorrect in fact, the stability of men engaged in trade and com-
merce would be exposed to the greatest hazard, for no man
would answer an inquiry as to the solvency of another.172
167. See W. BLAKE ODGERS, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 181-83 (The Black-
stone Publishing Company 1887).
168. See HENRY COLEMAN FOLKARD, FOLKARD’S STARKIE ON SLANDER AND LIBEL
48-49, 397 (Banks & Brothers 4th ed. 1877), https://play.google.com/books/read
er?id=U4UsAQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&hl=en&pg=GBS.PP
12; see also ODGERS, supra note 167, at 181-82, 204. On some understandings of the
law, “malice” was required in all defamation actions, but malice understood in that
sense was established by the mere publication of a false and injurious statement,
regardless of the speaker’s motivations or whether he had believed the statement
to be true.  Only in cases of qualified privilege did the law require malice in the
stronger sense of an intentional wrongful act. See COOLEY, supra note 166, at 210-
11.
169. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 286-87 (1845).
170. See COOLEY, supra note 166, at 215 n.4, 216 n.2.
171. See White, 44 U.S. at 286-87.
172. Smith v. Thomas, 4 Dowling 333, 340-41 (Kings Bench 1835), http://ia8
00302.us.archive.org/18/items/reportscasesarg10dowlgoog/reportscasesarg10
dowlgoog.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE9U-B9J3]; see also, Washburn v. Cooke, 3
Denio. 110, 112-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) (a speaker enjoys privilege “in answering
an inquiry concerning the solvency of a tradesman, or banker . . . .”).
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And so Sheldon Church—while not defending his report’s accu-
racy—countered that it had been privileged.  While Church had not per-
sonally been a fellow-merchant considering whether to trust the
Mississippi firm, he was able to argue that he was that inquiring
merchant’s agent.173  The New York trial court, though, was concerned.  It
saw businesses like Church’s, selling information about merchants’ charac-
ter and standing, as providing a valuable service so long as they conducted
their inquiries properly, and gave out only correct information.  But, the
court continued, “it is also evident, that if carelessly conducted, or if un-
true reports are furnished, even through error or mistake, the conse-
quence to those who are thus misrepresented may be very injurious.”174
In this case, the court continued, even if privilege would otherwise
have been available,175 the grounds for liability were plain.  Church’s re-
ports hadn’t gone only to the immediately concerned merchant.  They
had been printed, under his direction, and distributed to all the remain-
ing members of the merchants’ association—persons who had no immedi-
ate interest in learning about plaintiffs’ firm, but simply wanted the
reports for possible future reference.  Application of privilege when the
defamation was circulated so broadly was untenable: It “would produce
ruinous effects upon the standing and credit of those referred to, while
they themselves were in utter ignorance of the existence of such reports,
and unable, therefore, to guard against the effect of them.”176  Accord-
ingly, the court ruled, no privilege was available when publication was
made beyond directly interested parties.  Indeed, the opinion speculated,
privilege might have been lost the moment Church transmitted the report
to a printer.  The printer was not personally an interested party, the court
reasoned, and the mere fact that he had seen the report might have
breached the necessary confidentiality.177
The trial judge charged the jury that “if a party voluntarily engaged in
a system of espionage upon the character and conduct of others for his
private gain, communicating the result to third parties for a premium,”
then he was strictly liable for false statements made to persons who lacked
an interest in learning about the individuals whose character he had as-
persed.178  The jury awarded the equivalent of $175,000 in 2016 dollars.179
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that
Church’s statements were unprivileged and defamatory.  Notwithstanding
173. See Taylor v. Church, 1 E.D. Smith 279, 288 (N.Y. Ct. Common Pleas
1851), rev’d, 8 N.Y. 452 (1853).
174. Id. at 283.
175. The court reserved that question. Id. at 288.
176. Id. at 290.
177. See id. at 291.
178. Taylor v. Church, 8 N.Y. 452, 456-57 (1853).
179. The award was $6000. For the conversion, see Morgan Friedman, THE
INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://westegg.com/inflation/ [https://perma.cc/K3D
T-SEKX] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
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that holding, it reversed: it held that the trial court had erroneously ex-
cluded testimony, possibly relevant to damages, that Church had asked
that the printing be done as privately and confidentially as possible.180
In light of the considerations canvassed in Taylor v. Church, it’s easy to
see the merits of Tappan’s original plan for the Mercantile Agency.  Only
when a subscriber requested information concerning a particular data
subject would an Agency clerk read the file to him orally; no written docu-
ment authored by the Agency even left its premises.181  This neatly ad-
dressed the problem of dissemination of defamatory reports to persons
outside the firm with no legal interest in their content.  In addition, it
made it more difficult for rivals to appropriate and resell information the
Mercantile Agency had collected.182
That strategy wasn’t good enough, though, in the case of Beardsley v.
Tappan.183  John Beardsley ran a store with his brother in Norwalk, Ohio.
Initially, his Mercantile Agency write-ups were tolerably good, but then
came an 1848 entry reporting that Beardsley’s “wife is about to file a bill
for divorce & Alimony & that he has put his p[ro]p[er]ty out of his
hands . . . if so their store will probably be closed at once.”184  Beardsley
complained to Mercantile Agency manager Benjamin Douglass, but the
firm’s correspondent in Norwalk stuck to his story and Douglass refused
any changes.  Beardsley sued, and the Agency claimed both that the report
was privileged and that it was true.185
The trial was sensational, and widely covered in the press.  Mary
Beardsley, a difficult and possibly unstable partner, had indeed left her
husband’s house in June 1848 (moving in with her sister around the cor-
ner), but as of the time of John’s lawsuit five months later she had not in
fact filed for divorce.  Then, in December, a divorce petition was filed in
an Ohio court, purportedly on Mary’s behalf; it accused John of adultery
with seven women, including a mother-daughter pair; his lawyer’s wife;
and his sister-in-law.186  The petition would have appeared to have bol-
180. See Taylor, 8 N.Y. at 464.
181. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. But see supra note 74 (pol-
icy not consistently adhered to).
182. See Lipartito, supra note 43, at 10; see also OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 67-
68 (Douglass in 1858 was reluctant to publish ratings books because of libel and
intellectual-property considerations).
183. See REPORTS, supra note 50 (reprint of extensive case documents from
Beardsley).  Plaintiff brought suit in 1848, and the jury reached a verdict in his favor
in 1851.  The court refused rehearing in Beardsley v. Tappan, 2 F. Cas. 1187, 1187
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867), and the Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Tappan
v. Beardsley, 77 U.S. 427, 434-37 (1870).
184. SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 165 (quoting ledger entry).  Beardsley’s com-
plaint gives the wording slightly differently. See supra note 50, at 2-3.
185. See Beardsley, 2 Fed. Cas. at 1187-88.
186. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 175.  Sandage cites to the Bill of Exceptions
filed in the Beardsley case, but I don’t see the first divorce petition there; I do see a
second petition (filed in March 1849), which cut the number of adulteries to five
(but kept the mother-daughter pair). See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 58-59.
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stered the Agency’s case—but it then transpired in the Ohio proceeding
that the lawyer who had filed that petition had never met or received any
communications from Mary Beardsley, and had instead been hired by a
Norwalk man whom he refused to name.187  Douglass, refusing to identify
the Agency’s Norwalk correspondent, was jailed for contempt.188
Judge Samuel Betts, the veteran of a quarter-century on the federal
bench, instructed the jury at the close of testimony that the Agency’s re-
port did not fall within the realm of privilege.  Judge Betts’s starting point
was uncontroversial enough: a defendant was covered by privilege when
he communicated information, in good faith, to a merchant who sought
that information from him for legitimate business purposes.  But, the
judge continued, Lewis Tappan hadn’t limited himself to communicating,
man to man, with subscribers who had themselves personally made inquir-
ies.  Rather, he had sat at the apex of a mass-production enterprise.  Clerks
in his employ had transcribed ledger entries concerning Beardsley into
the Agency’s files, and other clerks had read them out to subscribers—
indeed not only to subscribers personally, but to the subscribers’ clerks.
That was too broad a publication.  No privilege would attach, the court
said, to “readings to or by persons other than the defendant [that is, Tap-
pan personally] and the merchant actually and personally interested in
obtaining information concerning the plaintiffs.”189  The jury awarded
Beardsley $10,000—the equivalent of almost $300,000 in today’s
money.190
This was a stunning rejection of Tappan’s business model.  The key
innovation of the Mercantile Agency was its application of the “principles
of mass production”191: It produced and sold information through the
medium of a bureaucratically organized firm, in which different individu-
als performed different specialized functions.  Judge Betts, though, ruled
that such a firm couldn’t claim protection against defamation liability.
Common-law privilege was reserved for personal communications, in an
informal realm of social relationships, in which both merchants and
tradesmen were operating as individuals, not firms.  It did not extend to
the bureaucratic systems of market and power that were just then begin-
187. See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 68-72.
188. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 173.  The firm released a testimonial signed
by employees, averring with deep irony that Douglass had the right to stand silent
because the law “recognize[d] [no] right to coerce an individual into a public
exposure of his private business.” See id. at 176.
189. REPORTS, supra note 50, at 83.
190. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 179; for the inflation conversion, see supra
note 179.  The Taylor court had flirted with a similar ruling, in its discussion of the
printer, but had left the matter unresolved. See supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
191. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ning to spring up in the new economy.192  Information, in the court’s un-
derstanding, could still be shared—but there were limits to the degree to
which it could be commoditized.
The Mercantile Agency sought rehearing, and in 1867 U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Nelson, sitting as a district court judge by designa-
tion, reaffirmed Judge Betts’s ruling.  On the one hand, he wrote,
merchants had a legitimate interest in looking into the character and
standing of customers seeking credit.  But “to legalize these establishments
in the manner and to the extent used by the defendant, is placing one
portion of the mercantile community under an organized system of espio-
nage and inquisition for the benefit of the other, exposed, from the very
nature of the organization, to perversion and abuse.”193  If such establish-
ments were to be allowed at all, he continued, Judge Betts’ limitation was a
reasonable one.194
The New York Times, reporting the story, recognized that if Justice
Nelson’s opinion were affirmed, it would be the end of Tappan’s model.
Those immense establishments, with numerous corps of clerks
and with long rows of desks on which lay numbers of immense
volumes in which could be learned a story, true or false, of any
merchant in any part of the country whatever, will probably pass
away. . . .  They may give place to smaller establishments, in
which one man may keep, for the information of those who deal
with him, similar knowledge as to the merchants in a section no
larger than he can manage by himself.195
In 1870, though, 22 years after Beardsley first brought his suit, the
U.S. Supreme Court ordered a new trial on unrelated grounds.  It had
been error, the Court held, to introduce the record of the Ohio divorce
hearing in the New York proceeding; Tappan had not been a party to that
hearing, and had not been in a position to protect his interests.196  Beards-
ley, spent, let the matter drop.
B. Limiting the Scope of Privilege
Not all the judges who encountered the Mercantile Agency in litiga-
tion saw it the same way as Judge Betts and Justice Nelson had.  While the
192. Cf. 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 113-89
(Thomas McCarthy trans. Beacon Press 1984) (1981) (distinguishing between
those two spheres of social life).
193. Beardsley v. Tappan, 2 Fed. Cas. 1187, 1187 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867).
194. See id.; REPORTS, supra note 50, at 127 (reprinted in more extensive
form).
195. See SANDAGE, supra note 7, at 317 n.41 (citing The Law of Mercantile Agen-
cies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1867), at 4 col. 4.
196. Tappan v. Beardsley, 77 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1870).  As in Taylor, the prob-
lem identified by the appellate court was that the jury, influenced by an unbal-
anced testimonial record, might have set damages too high.
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Beardsley lawsuit was winding its way through the courts, a different body of
law was taking shape.  In 1854, the Mercantile Agency reported to its cus-
tomers that a wealthy Maine tannery owner named Horace Billings was on
the verge of failure.  Billings sued in the Massachusetts courts.197 The
Agency didn’t defend the veracity of its report.  Indeed, at some point
before trial, it destroyed the only copy of the report in its books and substi-
tuted an innocuous one.198  It defended itself on the ground that Billings
could not prove it had spoken the words he charged, and that in any event
the communication was protected by privilege.
Justice Charles A. Dewey of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, sitting by designation,199 instructed the jury on both grounds in a
manner favorable to defendants.  He didn’t reference Judge Betts’s con-
cerns.  Rather, he explained, the jury should regard defendants as the
agents and employees of the customers they provided with information.
Thus privilege was available to each defendant so long as
upon the application of his principal, [he] made inquiries at the
proper places, and under proper and reasonable guards to en-
sure accuracy and privacy as to the information thus obtained,
and the information which he thus obtained was repeated bona
fide [solely] to his employer . . . for the purpose of governing
[the employer’s] conduct in his business transactions with the
party as to whom the inquiry was made.200
A moment’s thought should reveal the problem here.201  Defendants
were Edward Russell and Edwin Walters, the proprietors of the Mercantile
Agency’s Boston office.  Under any conventional understanding, they were
not the agents—and certainly not the employees—of the Mercantile
Agency’s clients.  Unlike Sheldon Church, they did not work for the firms
to which they provided information; they certainly did not take instruc-
tions from them.  Rather, they sold those firms a pre-packaged intellectual-
property product in an arms-length transaction.  Saying that Russell and
Walters were those firm’s employees and agents, under those circum-
stances, was not so different from saying that because I visit Kroger to buy
197. See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 129 (citing Billings v. Russell, 8 Boston L.
Rep. 699 (1855)).
198. See id. at 131 (citing Billings, 8 Boston L. Rep. 699)). According to de-
fendants, the substitution took place before Billings filed suit. See SANDAGE, supra
note 7, at 159-61.
199. See Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, http://www.mass.gov/courts/
docs/sjc/docs/reporter-of-decisions-sjc-justices-succession-chart.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3SR3-YE59] (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).  Justice Dewey came from a promi-
nent family; his father had been Daniel Dewey, himself a Justice of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court (and before that a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives).  See Daniel Dewey, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CON-
GRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000293
[https://perma.cc/S2RP-PXZB] (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
200. See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 132-33 (citing Billings).
201. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 72.
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its yogurt, the officers of the Kroger Company are my employees and
agents.  That’s not how agency works.
It may be that Justice Dewey was prone to embrace the agency charac-
terization because he found it hard to wrap his mind around the notion
that the Mercantile Agency had developed a new sort of business revolving
around the sale of an information product.  Thirty-five years later, the
South Dakota Supreme Court would still resist that framing: “Information
[and] intelligence,” it would say, are not “subjects of trade and barter,
offered in the market as something having an existence and value inde-
pendent of the parties to them. Neither are they commodities.”202  Absent
a perception that the Mercantile Agency was selling what we now think of
as intellectual property, it was easier for Justice Dewey to characterize what
the Agency was doing as, well, agency.203
That characterization mattered, though.  Even setting aside Judge
Betts’s concerns, if defendants’ speech fell outside the realm of agency, it
was not obvious that it fell within any conventional understanding of privi-
lege.  The core of the relevant notion of privilege had been that when an
individual found himself in a situation where social responsibility, fair
dealing, or the bonds of common interest and concern called for him to
convey information to another person who needed to know that informa-
tion, privilege enabled him to do so without fear of liability for honest
mistake.204  A nineteenth-century treatise described this as the case
“[w]here circumstances cast upon the defendant the duty of making a
communication to a certain other person.”205  It rested on the “legal or
moral” duty to speak.206
But that didn’t seem to be the Mercantile Agency’s situation.  No duty
had been “cast upon” it; it was proactively going out and collecting damag-
ing information that nobody had yet requested.207  There was more than a
little tension between the claim that it had a legal or moral duty to speak,
and the fact that it was willing to share its information only with those who
202. State v. Morgan, 48 N.W. 314, 321 (S.D. 1891) (rejecting a dormant com-
merce clause challenge to a law regulating mercantile agencies); see supra note 136
and accompanying text.
203. As late as 1903, the Bradstreet Company still asserted in legal filings that
it stood in an agency relationship with its subscribers. See Minter v. Bradstreet Co.,
73 S.W. 668, 669 (Mo. 1903); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 22 S.W. 358, 359-61 (Mo.
1893).
204. See ODGERS, supra note 167, at 196.
205. See id. at 197.
206. See id. at 182; see also White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 286-87 (1845).
207. When it received damaging information about a firm in its books, it sent
out notices inviting customers that had previously expressed an interest in that
firm to visit to learn the latest. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  That sort
of proactive initiation of contact too was arguably inconsistent with privilege. See
Storey v. Challands, 8 C. & P. Cas. 234 (Kings Bench 1837), https://books.google
.com/books?id=XGwwAAAAIAAJ&pg=PR1; see also ODGERS, supra note 167, at 158
(“I am not justified in standing at the door of a tradesman’s shop and voluntarily
defaming his character to his intending customers.”).
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paid.  It was hardly patent, thus, that its statements fell within the realm of
privilege.  Indeed, the eminent and influential Thomas Cooley would urge
in the first edition of his Treatise on the Law of Torts (a quarter-century
later) that they did not: “[I]f one makes it his business to furnish to others
information concerning the character, habits, standing and responsibility
of tradesmen, his business is not privileged, and he must justify his reports
by the truth.”208
In cases in 1868 (Ormsby v. Douglass209) and 1871 (Sunderlin v. Brad-
street210), the New York Court of Appeals charted what might initially have
appeared to be a middle path.  The court—the highest one in the state in
which both the Mercantile Agency and the Bradstreet Company were lo-
cated—began by holding that privilege does extend to a credit agency’s
communication of information to a customer with an immediate financial
interest in that information.  It did so without replicating Justice Dewey’s
error. Quite the contrary, the court made plain that “the defendants were
in no sense the agents of an association of merchants, or of their [custom-
ers].”  Instead, “[o]f their own volition, and for their own profit, they es-
tablished a bureau for collecting and disseminating information as to the
character, credit and pecuniary responsibility of merchants and traders
throughout the United States.”211  But that fact without more did not de-
prive the agencies of privilege.
In the 1868 Ormsby case, Judge Woodruff212 took the position that
privilege attached because the differences between the credit bureau
model and agency were immaterial.  There was no functional difference,
he said, between a person’s acting as an agent to collect information on
merchants’ behalf and his establishing a business selling information to
merchants and receiving his compensation that way.213  More importantly,
perhaps, such a person was doing valuable work:
I cannot concede that in the large population of a crowded city,
and in a mercantile community where false representations,
fraud, dishonesty and insolvency are easily concealed and but im-
perfectly known, or known to but few when detected, where it is
easy for strangers to practice upon the unwary or unsuspecting, a
business is to be characterized as unworthy which aims only to
208. COOLEY, supra note 166, at 217.
209. Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868).
210. Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N.Y. 188 (1871).
211. Id. at 191.
212. Justice Woodruff wrote the more extensive of the court’s two serial opin-
ions in Ormsby.
213. If one merchant may employ his own private agent to seek and commu-
nicate such information . . . there is no legal objection to the combination or
union of two or more in the employment of the same agent.  And . . . if an agent
may act for several, he may make the pursuit of such information his occupation,
and receive from those who desire to avail themselves of his services and his knowl-
edge acquired in such occupation a compensation therefore.  Ormsby, 37 N.Y. at
485.
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give correct information to those whose interests entitle them to
seek it wherever it may be had.214
One can see here an implicit reproof to Judge Betts and Justice Nel-
son: Old limitations on privilege were all very well for the old economy, in
which a merchant could learn everything he needed to know through old-
fashioned personal and social networks.  But in the new, teeming, anony-
mous city, Judge Woodruff seems to be saying, the forces of fair dealing,
honesty and good commercial order need more protection than that.
Three years later, though, in Sunderlin v. Bradstreet,215 Judge Allen was
more restrained.  A credit bureau, he said, was like an “intelligence of-
fice”—which was to say, an employment agency, collecting information
about the men and women it was placing with employers.216  Perhaps be-
cause the employment agencies of the time had a sketchy reputation and
in any event were oriented towards the laboring classes, Judge Allen felt
compelled to add that “it is not intended by this to intimate, that [the
credit bureau] is not an entirely lawful and reputable business; or that it is
not of general utility, or perhaps, a necessity to the commerce and busi-
ness of the country.”217  Was it entitled to privilege, so long as it limited its
communications to interested parties?  Yes, because under the common
law, privilege extended to a good-faith statement made in response to an
inquiry from an interested person, and even to a statement volunteered to
such a person, if the speaker’s relationship with the recipient made his
communicating the information a reasonable duty, or at least a proper
activity.218
At the same time, Judge Allen continued, a credit bureau enjoys no
privilege when it discloses information to persons without an immediate
financial interest in that information.  That doomed the Bradstreet Com-
pany’s case in Sunderlin: The defamatory statement there had been pub-
lished in the weekly notification sheets that the agency had sent to every
customer—yet few, if any, of the 10,000 people who had received the noti-
fication sheets had any interest in the plaintiffs’ character or financial con-
dition.219  As in Taylor v. Church, such broad dissemination was “officious
and unauthorized, and therefore, not protected.”220  Moreover, the fact
214. Id. at 486.
215. 46 N.Y. 188 (1871).
216. See, e.g., Laws of the State of New York (114th Sess. 1891), at 175 (listing
“pawnbrokers, junkshop keepers, cartmen, hackmen, dealers in second-hand mer-
chandise, intelligence-office keepers, and auctioneers of watches and jewelry” as
places to be kept under police scrutiny); id. at 369-70, 659-60; CAL. STAT. (12th
Sess. 1861) at 412-13; Rev. Ords. of City of St. Louis (1881) at 787-88; HORACE G.
WADLIN, UNEMPLOYMENT 81, 106-09, 256-57 (1894); Florence Hunt, “The Intelli-
gence Office,” 4 AM. KITCHEN MAG. #1 (Oct. 1895), at 70, available at https://
books.google.com/books?id=TR1IAAAAYAAJ.
217. Sunderlin, 46 N.Y. at 191.
218. See id. at 191-92.
219. See id. at 192.
220. Id. at 193.
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that the communication was made in code was immaterial, because every
customer-recipient had a key to the codes.221 Sunderlin, once again, cast a
vital element of the credit agencies’ business models into doubt: If notifi-
cations sheets were unprotected, how were the agencies to keep their sub-
scribers current?  And indeed, what about the ratings books that the
agencies had been publishing for the past decade?  They too were distrib-
uted to all subscribers.
For the next quarter-century, courts throughout the U.S. followed
Ormsby and Sunderlin.222  That was not good news for the credit bureaus.
The reported cases that followed uniformly involved challenges to state-
ments in notification sheets and reference books, and the courts uni-
formly declined to find those statements privileged.
A thoughtful 1882 opinion in Erber v. Dun,223 for example, began on a
positive note for defendants by characterizing the position of the lower
221. See id.
222. See Pollasky v. Minchener, 46 N.W. 5 (Mich. 1890); Mitchell v. Bradstreet
Co., 22 S.W. 358 (Mo. 1893); King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417 (N.J. 1887); Brad-
street v. Gill, 9 S.W. 753 (Tex. 1888); Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771 (D. Minn.
1885); Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 F. 214 (D. Md. 1882); Erber v. Dun, 12 F. 526 (E.D.
Ark. 1882); Louis M. Greeley, What Publications of Commercial Agencies Are Privileged,
35 AM. L. REG. 681 (1887); see also ERRANT, supra note 122, at 44; HARRIS W. SLATER,
THE LAW RELATING TO MERCANTILE REPORTS 8-9 (1896), http://scholar-
ship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses/355 [https://perma.cc/3XKC-L2Z8]
(same). There were outliers.  In Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886), the
Supreme Court of Georgia saw no basis for privilege in anything credit reporters
did: “To slander from hatred or vengeance for wrong is bad enough; to do so by
contract for money is infinitely worse.” Id. at 175.  The court ruled broadly that
“[i]f one makes it his business to pry into the affairs of another in order to coin
money for his investigations and information, he must see to it that he communi-
cate nothing that is false.” See id.; see also Pacific Packing Co. v. Broadstreet, 139 P.
1007 (Idaho 1914).  A trial court sent mixed signals in Commonwealth v. Stacey, 8
Phila. 617 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1871), reprinted in REPORTS, supra note 50, at 265-312.
That case involved a criminal indictment of a Mercantile Agency branch officer for
libel.  Judge Allison, sending the case to trial, resoundingly affirmed the Sunderlin
court’s approach, explaining:
A business such as that conducted by the defendant, if properly managed,
may be of the greatest service to the merchants and business men of the
country, but, if carried on with a reckless disregard of the rights of others,
may be converted into an evil, against which no man can protect himself;
its operations are secret; everything is sent out under the garb of confi-
dence, and thus the poisoned arrows which are launched in darkness,
may strike down the purest and most solvent in the land; no business man
is safe if this [notification sheet] can be recognized and protected by the
law as a privileged communication.
REPORTS, supra note 50, at 279.
At the close of testimony, however, Judge Finletter in terse remarks directed
the jury to acquit.  He noted that the state had proved delivery of only one copy of
the notification sheet, and that to an interested recipient.  More broadly, though,
he appeared to question the understanding of “interest” that was central to the
Sunderlin holding: “[T]he party receiving this letter, or note, or whatever it may be
called, had a right to know, as a member of the business community, all about any
other member of the business community in which he traded.” Id. at 312.
223. 12 F. 526 (E.D. Ark. 1882).
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courts in Beardsley as out of step with universal understandings about how
firms conducted business. The court explained:
Commercial and other business pursuits are conducted chiefly by
partnerships and corporations, and the former often, and the lat-
ter always, can act only by agents; and any rule of law that would
deny to them the right to avail themselves of the services of an
agent in every department of their business, and for every legiti-
mate purpose connected with it, is unsound.224
Turning to the general question of privilege, the court found it “ques-
tionable whether it is not pushing the doctrine of privileged communica-
tions beyond its legitimate scope” to apply it to credit bureaus’ sale of
information to subscribers.225  But on the strength of Ormsby (and in the
absence of contrary authority), it granted that point as well.  Nonetheless,
the court continued, the correctness of the Sunderlin rule was too clear for
argument: when a credit bureau distributed notification sheets to all sub-
scribers in a given geographic area rather than merely to those with an
immediate interest in the information, any incorrect statements in those
sheets were void of privilege.226
The fact that the Sunderlin rule imposed strict defamation liability on
the credit bureaus for a tremendously broad range of communications
didn’t escape the courts’ attention.  The highest court of New Jersey
adopted the Sunderlin rule in 1887, but by a vote of only 7-5, in King v.
Patterson.227  Justice Van Syckel, dissenting, urged that credit agencies were
essential to the economy, and that the Sunderlin rule would go far to de-
stroy their value.  Only the fact that the agencies had managed to keep
their communications to subscribers confidential (and thus away from the
eyes of injured potential plaintiffs) had so far saved them from a disastrous
flood of civil suits and criminal prosecutions.  Moreover, he argued, Sun-
derlin’s foundational concept was outmoded.
Business interests are so ramified at this day that large enterprises
cannot be successfully conducted without a comprehensive sur-
vey of the whole field of industry. . . . In fact, every man who has
merchandise to sell is, to some extent, interested in knowing how
every man in the country stands in credit.
224. Id. at 535; see also King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 428-29, (N.J. 1887)
(Beardsley approach was “unreasonable” because “[a]gents to collect information,
clerks to record it and to communicate it to subscribers . . . and confidential clerks
to receive the information [for] subscribers . . . are absolutely necessary to the
usefulness, if not the existence, of these institutions.”); Trussell, 18 F. at 216 (dis-
missing Judge Betts’s ruling as “a case decided some years ago,” a product of a time
when mercantile agencies were “very little known”).
225. See Erber, 12 F. at 536.
226. See id. at 538.
227. King, 49 N.J.L. at 417.  Counsel in that case included Flavel McGee for
plaintiff and Philamon Woodruff for defendant.  Why don’t lawyers have cool
names like that today?
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. . . .
The rule that a business man may inquire of his friend or his
neighbor, as to the responsibility of one who has applied for
credit, answered well enough 50 years ago, but it is altogether
inadequate to the present requirements of trade and
commerce.228
That argument did not carry the day in New Jersey, though, and it did
not carry the day elsewhere.  The Supreme Court of Michigan responded
directly three years later: “In [Justice Van Syckels’] desire to keep abreast
of the progressive state of society, and the new and varying conditions that
may arise in the progress of the age,” it wrote, “he has entirely overlooked
the rights of the individual . . . .”229  Rather, the Michigan court explained,
the Mercantile Agency and its competitors were “secret and inquisitorial
agencies” that “possess the power of destroying with falsehood or calumny
the credit of any business man in the country, and of bringing him to
bankruptcy and ruin.  To hold such vast secret inquisitions exempt from
liability for false publications . . . would be to sanction the highest
injustice.”230
Even where a credit bureau report was privileged, moreover, that did
not mean that the agency would escape liability.  The traditional under-
standing of “malice in fact”—necessary to piece a credit bureau’s qualified
privilege—had been something like “hatred, ill-will, and a malicious desire
to injure.”231  But as early as 1885, some jury instructions in credit-bureau
cases allowed the jury to find malice—defeating privilege where applica-
ble—on a showing of mere negligence or recklessness.232  Instructions
often jumbled together language that we would today read as conveying
different levels of scienter.233
In one case, thus, the court instructed the jury that it could find mal-
ice if the credit agency had acted in “the absence of probable cause”—
which the court seemed to treat as equivalent to defendant’s communicat-
ing the information “recklessly,” unfairly, “without exercising ordinary
care and caution in collecting it,” and “without reason to believe its
228. Id. at 440-41 (Van Syckels, J., dissenting).
229. Pollasky v. Minchener, 46 N.W. 5, 7 (Mich. 1890).
230. Id. at 6; see also Hanschke v. Merchants’ Credit Bureau, 256 Mich. 272,
239 N.W. 318 (1931).
231. Erber v. Dun, 12 F. 526, 530 (E.D. Ark. 1882); see supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Minter v. Bradstreet Co., 73 S.W. 668 (Mo. 1903); Pollasky, 46
N.W. at 7; Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771 (D. Minn. 1885); see also Greeley, supra
note 236, at 692.
233. A few courts ended up turning away from the Ormsby/Sunderlin approach
to base credit-bureau liability in negligence without regard to the extent of publi-
cation. See Douglass v. Daisley, 114 F. 628 (1st Cir. 1902); Giacona v. Bradstreet
Co., 20 So. 706 (La. 1896); see also Cossette v. Dun, [1890] 18 S.C.R. 222 (Can.),
available at https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/13811/index.do
[https://perma.cc/PDS4-87TY].
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truth.”234  In another, the Supreme Court of Missouri explained that “neg-
lect, carelessness, and want of due regard for the rights of others” were as
bad as willful injury, so that a credit bureau’s officers could be held liable
simply because defendants “had good reason to believe that the state-
ments they were making were untrue.”235
In sum, through the end of the nineteenth century, it doesn’t appear
that the courts understood their role as one of protecting the credit-re-
porting process from lawsuits.  While some judicial opinions spoke to the
essential role of credit bureaus in the economy, even more expressed con-
cern about the companies’ “secret and inquisitorial” nature, and the need
for law to operate as a restraint.  The doctrinal rules I’ve surveyed suggest
an ample role for plaintiffs in holding the agencies to account for damag-
ing statements in credit reports.  This raises a final question, though.
There aren’t that many reported cases involving defamation suits against
credit bureaus.  The Mercantile Agency and the Bradstreet Company were
able to thrive notwithstanding the occasional damages payout.  What hap-
pened?  How were they able to defend themselves so well?
V. WHY LITIGATION FAILED, OR, WHY EQUIFAX IS WHAT IT IS TODAY
A range of factors helped protect the Mercantile Agency and the
Bradstreet Company from liability.  First, their lawyers litigated aggres-
sively,236 and took advantage of restrictive pleading and proof rules baked
into the common law of defamation.  Plaintiffs, for example, were often
tripped up by the need to allege and prove special damages in cases where
the challenged statements were deemed not defamatory per se.237
As Justice Van Syckels noted,238 credit bureau secrecy played another
key role.  Mercantile Agency subscriber contracts explicitly forbade sub-
234. Locke, 22 F. at 774.
235. Minter, 73 S.W. at 683.  This late-nineteenth-century shift in the under-
standing of “actual malice” wasn’t limited to credit-bureau cases. See, e.g., Ramsey
v. Cheek, 13 S.E. 775, 775-77 (N.C. 1891) (explaining “actual malice,” and wander-
ing around the landscape of knowing falsity, recklessness, and negligence).  The
U.S. Supreme Court’s reproduction of that same shift in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), has bedeviled generations of law students since then.
236. See Flandreau & Mesevage, supra note 135, at 240-46.
237. See, e.g., Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 139 P. 1007, 1008-09
(Idaho 1914); Woodruff v. Bradstreet, 22 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1889).  In Newbold v. J.M.
Bradstreet & Son, 57 Md. 38 (1881), the credit agency had indicated in notifica-
tion sheets that plaintiff had given a chattel mortgage—that is, that it had trans-
ferred conditional ownership of personal property as security for a loan.  Plaintiff’s
creditors had made the obvious inference, called in their (unsecured) loans, and
refused to extend additional credit.  The court, however, held that the statement
had not been libelous per se, and that plaintiff’s proof of damages was therefore
insufficient absent testimony from the specific creditors that had shunned it mak-
ing the causal connection between the credit report and their actions. See id. at 53-
55.
238. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
37
Weinberg: "Know Everything That Can Be Known About Everybody": The Birth of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
468 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 431
scribers to disclose credit bureau reports or ratings to anyone else.239  Just
to underline that point, the Mercantile Agency issued its first ratings vol-
ume with a lock and key.240  This had obvious intellectual-property value;
the credit bureaus would have had a harder time recouping their invest-
ment if the product they were selling could circulate freely to folks who
weren’t paying subscribers.  But more importantly for our purposes, it
made it harder for Mercantile Agency data subjects to find out what the
company was saying about them.  The Mercantile Agency threatened legal
liability against subscribers who had disclosed reports to plaintiffs, or who
it feared would supply a link of plaintiff’s case-in-chief in court.241  What
plaintiffs didn’t know–-or couldn’t prove—couldn’t be the basis for suit.
Both for intellectual-property and for lawsuit-prevention purposes,
credit bureau secrecy took the firms’ communications out of the public
domain, into a more restricted, private realm.  Lawsuits take place in the
light; but these reports were somewhere else.  It’s worth noting here that
nineteenth-century discovery rules were more restrictive than today’s.242
239. See REPORTS, supra note 50, at 145.
240. See OLEGARIO, supra note 12, at 68.
241. See Flandreau & Mesevage, supra note 135, at 242-43.  I’m aware of only
one instance in which the Mercantile Agency actually brought a claim in court
against a subscriber for breach of confidentiality; it was a suit for indemnification,
in Canadian court, after the firm had lost a libel judgment. See An Interesting Case,
MANITOBA FREE PRESS (Feb. 10, 1888), at 1; Barry Cohen, Constructing an Uncertain
Economy: Credit Reporting and Credit Rating in the Nineteenth Century United States, at
754 (Mar. 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University).  I don’t know how
that case came out.  More broadly, though, because the Agency could obtain plain-
tiffs’ witness lists before trial, the threat of liability provided a significant avenue of
pressure on subscribers who might testify that they had seen the damning reports.
Although the law of trade secrecy was in its infancy in the nineteenth century, as a
general matter courts were willing to enforce contractual promises of confidential-
ity. See Tode v. Gross, 28 N.E. 469 (N.Y. 1891); Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v.
Dodds, 1887 Ohio Misc. Lexis 181 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1887); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452 (1868); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370 (1866); Vickery v. Welch, 26
Mass. 523 (1837).
242. There were some cases in which defendants were successful in gaining
access to ledger entries. For example, in Raymond v. Russell, an 1888 credit-bureau
defamation suit litigated in Massachusetts courts, plaintiff not only called defen-
dant as a witness, but had him read from the ledger entries on the stand. See Selah,
the Mystic Word: The Raymond-Russell Suit Continued, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE (Mar. 9,
1988), at 3.  In the Beardsley case, the record recites that plaintiff notified defen-
dant it would offer parol evidence of the ledger entries if defendant failed to pro-
duce them, and defendant did produce the records at trial. See REPORTS, supra
note 50, at 10-11.  More generally, though, there were considerable obstacles for
nineteenth-century defamation plaintiffs seeking court-ordered access to credit-bu-
reau ledgers.  It was a challenging matter to get any federal-court discovery before
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. See Sinclair Refining
v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689 (1933); see also Stephen N. Subrin,
Fishing Expedition Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules,
39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698-701 (1998).  Discovery in state courts was much more
limited than today, even where the state had adopted a version of the Field Code
of Civil Procedure (first promulgated in New York in 1848).  Many state-court
judges were highly skeptical about discovery.  Thus, the court in Stalker v. Gaunt, 12
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Restrictions keeping credit-agency reports from public view, thus, were
likely to be effective.  Many years after the events of this paper, the Su-
preme Court would suggest that credit reports belong to a private domain
set aside from our communal life: they concern no public issue, a plurality
of the Justices said, and are unrelated to debate in the public sphere.243
But the modern Court took for granted that discovery could bring credit
reports into the light, so that even private matters could be the subject of
litigation.  That wasn’t entirely so in the days of the Mercantile Agency.
In part for litigation-related reasons, agencies were reluctant to com-
mit the most damning reports to paper at all.  Notification sheets and rat-
ings books, rather than including truly damaging information, might
instead contain a “call at office” notation, or a blank rating.244  It was
quickly well-understood that such notations indicated that the subject’s
N.Y. Leg. Obs. 132 (N.Y. 1854), warned that plaintiffs requesting production of
books and documents from defendants sought a “delicate, and often dangerous
source of evidence”; such discovery, too broadly countenanced, it would open
“every merchant’s accounts, and every man’s private papers, to the inspection of
the merely curious.” Id. at 137; see also Wynn v. Taylor, 109 Ill. 603 (1903); Davis v.
Dunham, 13 How Pr. 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (decrying the “dangerous, vexatious
and impertinent meddling with the private business and affairs of another” that
excessive discovery would bring (quoting Brevoort v. Warner, 8 How. 321 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1853)). But see Powers v. Elmendorf, 4 How. Pr. 60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849)
(articulating a more sympathetic view).  Pre-Field Code, requests for discovery
were made via a bill in equity.  Where the parties had no pre-existing relationship,
a court would order document production only if the applicant provided detailed
support for his position that the specifically-identified document sought was neces-
sary to his case-in-chief and that the relevant evidence could not be obtained any
other way. See Wertheim v. Continental Ry. & Trust Co., 15 F. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1883);
Vieller v. Oppenheim, 31 Abb. N. Cas. 181 (N.Y. 1894); Condict v. Wood, 25 N.J.L.
319 (N.J. 1855); Copper King of Arizona v. Robert, 74 A. 292 (N.J. Ch. 1909);
Stalker, 12 N.Y. Leg. Obs. at 132.  Even so, the document production might be
delayed until the relevant witness was examined at trial, rather than being available
before. See Raub v. Van Horn, 19 A. 704 (Pa. 1890).  Post-Field Code cases carried
many of these same limitations forward. See SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 757-59, at 603-04 (1889).
More saliently, some courts held that document discovery was not available at all in
defamation cases, either because of the limitations of (pre-Code) chancery prac-
tice or because production would incriminate defendant in a common-law crime.
See Noyes v. Thorpe, 62 A. 787 (N.H. 1906); Harper v. Pinkston, 17 S.E. 161 (N.C.
1893); Opdyke v. Marble, 18 Abb. Pr. 266 (N.Y. 1864). But see Kraus v. Sentinel
Co., 23 N.W. 12 (Wisc. 1885).  At least one court, finally, held that individual de-
fendants could not be required to produce the books of the corporation that em-
ployed them. See Opdyke, 18 Abb. Pr. 266 at 266. But see THOMPSON, supra, § 597, at
747 (criticizing that holding).
243. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985).  The Court held that it was permissible for a court to allow the award of
presumed and punitive damages in a suit over a negligently false credit report,
notwithstanding that the jury had not been asked to find “actual malice” as defined
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  The plurality reasoned that the credit
report was akin to commercial speech, and that the confidentiality restrictions on
its dissemination further disconnected it from core first amendment debate. Dun
& Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-63.
244. See Carruthers & Cohen, supra note 89, at 19-21.
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credit was problematic (and that subscribers could call at the office to
learn exactly in what way it was problematic).  Because that was so well
understood, this technique wasn’t hugely effective in shielding credit
agencies from liability.245  Once again, though, it helped keep damning
reports from potential plaintiffs’ eyes, and on occasion, it provided a route
to a trial-court win.246
Finally, the credit agencies’ avoidance of legal jeopardy in the late
nineteenth century was tied up with their development of ratings books in
which the agency’s entire store of information about a data subject was
boiled down, through opaque and undisclosed means, to a single code no
more than two or three characters long.  What did a ratings code mean?
The absence of a code might mean something: Plaintiffs were often success-
ful in suing when an agency left their code blank,247 or replaced it with a
“call at office” listing.248  In those cases, they argued, the omission implied
the worst.  But an actual code—an “A” or a “B”—was more opaque.  What
specific underlying facts did it imply?  It was hard to say.  Could a defama-
tion plaintiff establish that no facts existed that, when fed into defendant’s
unknown and undisclosed algorithm, could justify the published rating?
I’ve found no nineteenth-century reported case in which a plaintiff
sued on the basis of a negative code in a ratings book—and that’s notwith-
standing that, under Sunderlin, defendant enjoyed no privilege for those
communications.  In part, such cases were absent or few because credit
agencies substituted some form of “call at office,” or a blank listing, for the
ratings code where its judgment was most negative.  In important part, it
may have been because a moderately negative code was deemed not libel
per se, casting on plaintiff the more challenging job of proving special dam-
ages flowing from its less-favorable rating.249
Beyond that, though, the absence of such cases reflects the way the
credit bureaus’ output, over time, became an increasingly abstracted and
flattened version of the human stories the Mercantile Agency had started
with.  As ratings began to resemble impenetrable but obscure scientific
judgments, it became harder to make them the basis for suit.
245. Most courts treated the question whether such a notation was defama-
tory as a jury matter. See, e.g., Erber v. Dun, 12 F. 526, 531 (E.D. Ark. 1882);
Codner v. Central Credit Rating Agency, 161 N.W. 657, 657-58 (Iowa 1917); Brad-
street v. Gill, 9 S.W. 753, 755-756 (Tex. 1888); Commonwealth v. Stacey, 8 Phila.
617 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1871), reprinted in REPORTS, supra note 50; Carruthers & Co-
hen, supra note 89, at 21.
246. See Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass’n, 104 P. 769 (Wash. 1909) (be-
cause “call at office” notation was not libel per se, the complaint was insufficient
absent pleading of the names of people who refused credit or custom); Kingsbury
v. Bradstreet, 22 N.E. 365 (N.Y. 1889) (“call at office” notation not shown in trial
record to be defamatory).
247. See Bradstreet v. Gill, 9 S.W. 753 (Tex. 1888).
248. See supra notes 243-245 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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Reducing thick credit narratives to a single ratings code, in short,
played multiple functions. First, it made the ratings books possible—and
more generally, it made it possible for the Mercantile Agency and its com-
petitors to sell credit information in a convenient, customer-friendly form.
If a company bought credit information in this format, it was buying the
ability to make credit decisions quickly, cheaply, and thoughtlessly.  It was
a far cry from a customer’s having to visit the Agency office to receive a
lengthy and detailed oral report, or even a written narrative report that
would have to be digested and evaluated.
Second, it camouflaged the quality of the agency’s data.  Whether
sources were reliable or not, whether information was recent or stale,
whether it was thin or detailed—all of that disappeared behind the inscru-
table code.  Did a ratings agency have the resources to conduct business
legitimately?  The codes supplied no clue.
Third, the codes’ obscurantism helped shield the companies from lia-
bility.  The Mercantile Agency continued to allow its subscribers access to
narrative reports until well into the twentieth century; subscribers who
wanted to dig more deeply were not limited to the ratings codes.  But the
underlying facts were shielded by both secrecy and privilege.
There’s an irony here.  The Mercantile Agency and its competitors
took us all a first step down the road to a realm of Panopticon-like trans-
parency, in which information about us, in our roles as citizens and con-
sumers, came to be widely available and freely sold in the marketplace.
But the Mercantile Agency’s pursuit of transparency for us was only made
possible by its secrecy when it came to its own operations and files.  Had
the Agency been as transparent to the public eye as it was causing the rest
of us to be, it never could have gotten off the ground.
VI. PRIVILEGE AND PRIVACY, THEN AND NOW
The story of the Mercantile Agency suggests that Americans in the
nineteenth century faced the same privacy issues we do today.  By virtue of
surveillance of their everyday lives, information about them was stored in
centralized databases, held by proprietors essentially unaccountable to
them, so that they weren’t even in a position to find out what their own
files revealed.  Yet the information was widely sold on the market, easily
available to any business willing to pay.  Today, we understand that sense
of having our identities thrown open to strangers, about that loss of con-
trol; those are our issues.
The nineteenth-century credit bureaus’ manipulation of their sub-
jects’ information, moreover, wasn’t harmless.  Out of data subjects’ view,
database proprietors transformed their personal information to ratings;
their business fortunes would rise and fall on whether the ratings were
good or bad.  We know about that as well.  Privacy scholars today address
the rise of “black box” algorithms—structures in which governments and
corporations decide how to treat each of us by collecting huge amounts of
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data and processing that data through opaque, unknowable computer al-
gorithms.  Computers processing Big Data, we’ve discovered, can develop
ever more powerful ways to learn from and manipulate that data, in ways
increasingly resistant to human interrogation and arguably incomprehen-
sible by human minds.250
But that too is not really new.  The Mercantile Agency and Bradstreet
Company ratings codes were products of the nineteenth century’s antici-
pation of the black-box algorithm.  Though they were the triggers of
(sometimes catastrophic) action, from the point of view of the data sub-
ject, they were the result of the agencies’ processing unknown facts
through an opaque filter.  That’s part of what made them so difficult to
challenge.
Unlike us, Americans in the nineteenth century didn’t have the legal
tools or language of privacy to frame their concerns.  There was no cause
of action for privacy invasion.251  The lawsuits I’ve canvassed in this paper
didn’t vindicate privacy harms.  They granted relief only to people who
had suffered defamation harms—only to people whose reputations had
been damaged by false statements, causing them damage in their business
dealings.
And yet the courts’ responses to the questions raised in those cases
resonate in notable ways with modern privacy thinking.  Recall Judge
Betts’s and Justice Nelson’s view that the legal system should favor per-
sonal communications embedded in an informal realm of trade relation-
ships, not the sale of information as a commodity by new, impersonal,
bureaucratized structures.  That concern found its echoes in the Ormsby/
Sunderlin rule focusing on the scope of information dissemination: the
courts denied legal protection when the agencies sold their data to entities
that did not have some meaningful real-life relationship with the data sub-
ject, either existing or planned.  Responding to the commodification of
information, the law resisted the transformation of information about a
data subject into an object of sale wholly disconnected from the subject’s
relationships in the real world.
250. This presents tremendous challenges: how can we ensure that such com-
puter-mediated action conforms to norms of anti-discrimination and fairness? See
generally, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Robert Brauneis & Ellen Goodman,
Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, YALE J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming), https:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=3012499 [https://perma.cc/
QC5S-8HSN]; Anupam Chandler, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023
(2017); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Lilian Edwards &
Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not
the Remedy You Are Looking For, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=2972855 [https://perma.cc/X9R6-SLSF]; James Grimmelman &
Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164
(2017); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181 (2017).
251. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
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That the nineteenth-century courts’ concern with the commodifica-
tion of personal information foreshadowed modern thought isn’t a hard
argument to make.  But the courts’ concern for scope of disclosure finds
echoes in with modern thought as well.252  Contemporary privacy dis-
course emphasizes that privacy is contextual.  “Privacy is not a discrete
commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”253  Rather, what’s most im-
portant is the scope of dissemination of data about you.  A person may
share information with her friends that she doesn’t want to share with her
employer, or with strangers.254  Helen Nissenbaum thus describes privacy
invasions as violations of norms of information flow: they take place when
information about a person is distributed without regard to norms empha-
sizing such values as free choice, confidentiality, need, entitlement and
obligation.255
That concern was baked deeply into the nineteenth-century case law.
Central to those cases was the idea that there are people to whom your
personal information can legitimately flow, and others to whom it should
not.  Whatever the “system of espionage”256 the credit bureaus put in
place, they crossed a legal line when they crossed that line of legitimate
information distribution.
Imagine what modern privacy law might look like if those restrictions
had taken better hold a century ago.  Imagine those concerns remaining
powerful as modern privacy law began to develop in the early twentieth
century, informing prohibitions on the dissemination of information
rather than merely bounding the scope of privilege.  It would still be the
case that a firm interacting directly with a consumer, and in the course of
that interaction collecting information about her, would be able to store
that information in a database and rely on it to guide its further transac-
252. To be sure, that concern fit squarely into the existing law of privilege.
Moreover, at least one of the concerns expressed in the case law about broad dis-
semination of information was specific to defamation law; I’m thinking of the fear
that damaging errors could circulate widely, with the subject unable to redress
them. See, e.g., supra note 176 and accompanying text.
253. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
254. See Julie Cohen, What is Privacy For?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1908
(2013).
255. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 145-46 (2009).  For a fascinating early discussion, see
Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26 (1976).
Norms of information flow, to be sure, can be an unstable source of privacy rules.
As Nissenbaum concedes, putting forward existing informational norms as
benchmarks for privacy protection can be conservative in harmful ways when those
existing norms are not privacy-protective. See NISSENBAUM, supra, at 161-64; see also
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 431, 439 (2016) (relying on context-sensitive privacy norms to gener-
ate privacy rules comes close to simply asking whether consumers find a practice
“creepy”); Michael D. Birnhack, A Quest for a Theory of Privacy: Context and Control,
51(4) JURIUMETRICS 447 (2011).
256. Beardsley v. Tappan, 2 Fed. Cas. 1187, 1187 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867); Taylor
v. Church, 8 N.Y. 452, 456-57 (1853).
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tions with her.  But that firm would face hugely greater restrictions in com-
modifying and alienating that information, in putting it for sale on the
open market.  The resulting body of privacy law, one can imagine, would
have more closely resembled law in the modern European Union, under
which a firm may not disseminate personal information beyond the “speci-
fied, explicit and legitimate purposes” for which it was collected.257
If modern privacy law had grown up taking seriously the concerns of
the nineteenth-century case law about dissemination of information to
those without legitimate interest, the function of the data broker would
itself have been questionable.  As Judge Betts asked, do employees of the
data broker themselves have “legitimate interest” in learning damaging in-
formation about the strangers whose data they store?  But assuming the
existence of data brokers, an Ormsby/Sunderlin style privacy law would have
sharply restrained the commodification of information by restricting their
transfer of information to persons without a pre-existing relationship with
the data subject.258
It’s important to bear in mind, though, two very large caveats.  The
first is that there’s a big jump from the limited scope of the doctrines
discussed in this paper, merely marking the boundaries of privilege, and
the potentially sharper prohibitions of modern privacy law.  Credit-bureau
defendants could win cases even when the case law denied them privilege.
The legal development that I am imagining here involves carrying nine-
teenth-century concerns relating to dissemination of information into a
body of privacy law that did not develop until decades later.
Second, this imaginative exercise has so far unmoored the nine-
teenth-century case law from its historical context.  The nineteenth-cen-
tury decisions were handed down in a newly urbanizing world, in one in
which the nature of social and industrial organization was changing.  The
new credit bureaus were the emissaries and the reflection of a new era—
one in which information was not carried in the heads of individuals, but
instead was maintained and sold by bureaucratically organized private
firms each harnessing “a thousand brain workers.”259
The nineteenth-century credit bureau case law reflects a broad judi-
cial ambivalence about these new forms of organization and new social
relationships.  Could legal rules developed for a world in which business
firms were individual persons, and their business relationships were em-
bedded in the framework of the social relationships that governed them as
individuals, be translated to the new bureaucratic systems of market and
257. Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(b), on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, 1995 (O.J.) (L 281) (EC).
258. To an American reader, it might be almost unthinkable that the law
could put such a restraint in place.  In fact, though, the law in force in the Euro-
pean Union today incorporates comparable rules. See supra note 256 and accom-
panying text.
259. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss3/3
2018] BIRTH OF THE CREDIT REPORT 475
power?  Would doing so invite “perversion and abuse”260 from the new,
more powerful business entities?  And how should the law respond to the
challenges to business trust posed in the anonymous modern city, where
social mechanisms no longer worked to restrain fraud and deception?
Judge Betts’s ruling in Beardsley can be seen as a pushback against not
just the credit bureau, but against the new, bureaucratically organized bus-
iness firm writ large.  It almost reflects a yearning for simpler days of per-
sonal relationships.  Against that we see Justice Van Syckel’s response,
dissenting in King v. Patterson: the Ormsby/Sunderlin distinction, he wrote,
“answered well enough fifty years ago,” but it was a bad fit for the nature of
business in the new modern age.261
By the time modern privacy law got off the ground in the twentieth
century,262 that late-nineteenth-century battle over new forms of business
organization was done, and judges resistant to the new forms had lost.
The legal efforts to restrain the credit bureaus lost the force lent by their
initial historical moment.  It’s not surprising, perhaps, that they failed to
bear more fruit in the twentieth century.  In our contemporary data pri-
vacy landscape we see no restriction on alienation, no restriction on com-
modification, no legal incentive to data proprietors to limit dissemination
to persons who are “interested.”  Quite the contrary, information about
you—your purchases, your characteristics, your propensities—is routinely
sold by data brokers to entities with no connection to you at all.  The con-
cerns of Judge Betts and others have been left behind.
VII. CONCLUSION
The nineteenth-century credit bureau was a marvel of engineering.  It
created an early, computer-free, version of the database system, maintain-
ing and updating files—in the case of the Mercantile Agency—on well
over a million people by 1890.  Essaying to reduce the thick narratives in
individual files to quick opaque ratings, it struggled with issues that still
challenge us.  And it gave rise to privacy concerns closely paralleling the
ones we face today.
Notwithstanding widespread concern about the new credit bureau
privacy threat, the lawyers and judges of the period didn’t have the vocab-
ulary or the tools to articulate privacy-related legal claims.  Instead, privacy
issues ending up finding their way into the law of credit bureaus only in
the context of defamation lawsuits.  The defamation case law of the period
displays apprehension about the commoditization of information, and
about the untrammeled distribution of information about individuals, that
resonates with modern privacy thinking.  In the end, though—much like
the law of today, perhaps—it didn’t meaningfully address the privacy chal-
lenges the credit bureaus posed.
260. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 227 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
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